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Abstract	
The	No	Child	Left	Behind	education	act,	signed	by	President	Bush	in	2002,	imposed	
high‐stakes	testing	standards	on	all	schools	in	the	nation.	A	decade	later,	amidst	a	
cheating	scandal	and	a	budget	crisis,	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia	experienced	
dramatic	standardized	test	score	declines	after	nine	years	of	increases.	This	study	
aims	to	place	these	declines	in	the	context	of	national,	state,	and	local	education	
policy	and	provide	statistical	evidence	for	the	cause	of	the	declines.	School	climate	
among	schools	flagged	for	cheating	and	budget	decreases	experienced	by	all	
Philadelphia	schools	significantly	contributed	to	the	declines.	Nevertheless,	the	
major	finding	faults	the	elimination	of	cheating,	enforced	by	the	use	of	increased	
testing	security	in	2012,	for	the	lower	test	scores.	The	analysis	supports	existing	
theory	that	high	stakes	testing	encourages	administrative	cheating	and	hinders	the	
educational	achievement	of	students.	
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I.	Introduction	
	 In	2010,	Roosevelt	Middle	School,	a	school	with	an	85%	poverty	
concentration	located	in	the	Germantown	neighborhood	of	Philadelphia,	
Pennsylvania,	gathered	the	attention	of	several	education	advocates	for	impressive	
improvements	in	academic	achievement.		In	2008,	only	25.6%	of	Roosevelt’s	
students	were	proficient	in	math	while	29.7%	were	proficient	in	reading.	In	just	two	
years,	these	figures	jumped	to	75%	proficient	in	math	and	78.2%	proficient	in	
reading.	The	school’s	teachers	and	staff	were	applauded	for	beating	the	odds	and	
overcoming	obstacles	such	as	poverty,	violence,	and	teenage	pregnancy.	Roosevelt’s	
principal	noted,	“if	you	think	miracles	can’t	happen,	look	at	us.”1	Then‐Pennsylvania	
Governor	Ed	Rendell	commented	how	Roosevelt	proved	politician’s	doubts	about	
Philadelphia	wrong.	Even	the	US	Secretary	of	Education,	Arne	Duncan,	joined	in	the	
celebrations	by	personally	congratulating	Philadelphia’s	superintendant	and	
Roosevelt’s	principal.		
	 Roosevelt’s	success	was	part	of	a	citywide	trend	of	progress	across	several	
key	indicators	measured	in	2011.		Standardized	test	scores	in	Philadelphia	
increased	for	the	ninth	straight	year	in	both	reading	and	math.	The	graduation	rate	
for	public	school	students	was	at	an	all	time	high.	More	schools	met	federal	No	Child	
Left	Behind	standards	than	ever	before.	Although	then‐Superintendent	Arlene	
Ackerman	admitted	that	the	District	“[had]	a	long	way	to	go,”	the	public	viewed	
																																																								
1	Graham,	Kristen;	Purcell,	Dylan.	“City	school’s	fast	rising	test	scores	questioned”.	The	Philadelphia	
Inquirer.	May	1,	2011.	
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Philadelphia	as	a	District	where—slowly,	but	surely—progress	had	occurred.2	In	an	
editorial,	The	Philadelphia	Inquirer	claimed	that	progress	made	in	Philadelphia	
schools	was	“encouraging	and	worth	applauding…they	show	that	efforts	to	improve	
academic	achievement	in	the	city’s	public	schools	are	slowly	making	a	difference.”3	
The	Pew	Charitable	Trusts	noted	“Philadelphia’s	education	numbers	tell	a	story	of	
much	that	has	been	accomplished…”.4		The	Council	of	Great	City	Schools	named	
Ackerman	the	best	urban	superintendent	in	the	country.5	Much	like	the	city	itself,	
the	School	District	successfully	combated	its	reputation	of	being	broken	and	
unfixable.		
	 Unfortunately,	the	cautious	optimism	surrounding	the	District—one	that	
took	years	to	build—evaporated	quickly	over	the	course	of	the	next	year.	First,	the	
District	spent	the	entire	year	trying	to	close	a	$715	million	budget	shortfall	that	
arose	due	to	both	state	budget	cuts	and	District	mismanagement.6	The	District	also	
dealt	with	a	transition	of	leadership	as	four	different	people	led	the	District	between	
August	2011	and	October	2012.	Under	extreme	pressure	from	her	employers,	
Ackerman	left	the	District	in	August.	Her	Deputy,	Leroy	Nunery,	led	as	Acting	
Superintendent	until	January	2012,	when	Thomas	Knudsen	was	then	temporarily	
brought	in	as	Chief	Recovery	Officer	(with	the	power	of	both	a	superintendent	and	
chief	financial	officer)	in	an	attempt	to	curb	the	District’s	rapidly	deteriorating	
																																																								
2	Graham,	Kristen.	“A	test‐score	milestone	for	Phila.	schools”.	The	Philadelphia	Inquirer.	June	17,	
2010.		
3	“Editorial:	Applaud,	but	lightly”.	The	Philadelphia	Inquirer.	June	19,	2010.	
4	“Philadelphia	2011:	The	State	of	the	City”.	The	Pew	Charitable	Trusts.	Apr.	9,	2011.		
5	“Philadelphia	Superintendent	Wins	Nation’s	Top	Prize”.	Council	of	the	Great	City	Schools.	Oct.	21,	
2010.		
6	Mezzacappa,	Dale.	“Budget	‘ominous,’	further	cuts	required;	District	to	hire	recovery	officer”.	The	
Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook.	Jan	19,	2012.		
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budget	situation.	Ackerman’s	permanent	successor,	Dr.	William	Hite,	was	appointed	
in	the	summer	of	2012	but	did	not	officially	start	until	October.	Thus,	for	over	a	year,	
Philadelphia	schools	were	left	with	a	limbo	of	leadership	without	clear	direction.	
	 Yet	even	with	these	already	negative	occurrences,	the	most	damaging	effect	
on	Philadelphia’s	education	outlook	arrived	with	a	cheating	scandal	that	first	broke	
out	in	the	summer	of	2011.		Across	the	entire	state,	several	schools	and	Districts	
contained	suspicious	amounts	of	corrective	erasure	markings	on	standardized	tests.	
The	vast	majority	of	these	suspicions	came	from	Philadelphia,	where	more	than	
25%	of	all	District	run	schools	were	publicly	flagged	for	multiple	erasure	
irregularities	between	2009‐2011.	Roosevelt	Middle	School—whose	academic	rise	
had	seemed	too	good	to	be	true—was	flagged	for	every	grade	level	in	every	subject	
across	all	three	years	that	were	investigated.	Doubts	on	the	credibility	of	the	
previous	nine	years	of	test	score	increases	immediately	surfaced	as	both	the	state	
and	the	District	continued	to	investigate	cheating	accusations—an	effort	that	is	still	
ongoing	at	the	time	of	this	study.	
	 In	an	effort	to	combat	this	alleged	cheating,	the	School	District	increased	
security	measures	for	all	schools	under	their	jurisdiction	in	2012,	with	particular	
scrutiny	on	the	flagged	schools.	Teachers	could	not	administrate	tests	to	their	own	
students.	Boxes	containing	test	booklets	remained	locked	and	unopened	until	hours	
before	test	time.	Central	Office	staff	aided	the	process	by	monitoring	school	
hallways	and	classrooms	during	tests.		
	 When	all	the	2012	tests	were	taken	and	scores	calculated,	Philadelphia’s	
proficiency	rate	plummeted	across	every	grade	and	student	subgroup.	Overall	math	
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proficiency	rates	dropped	8.7	percentage	points	(from	57.8%	in	2011	to	49.1%	in	
2012).	Similarly,	reading	proficiency	rates	dropped	7.1	percentage	points	(from	
51.6%	to	44.5%).	The	2012	test	score	declines	put	Philadelphia	back	on	2008	test‐
proficiency	levels.	Meanwhile,	Roosevelt’s	scores	plummeted	by	around	50%	in	
both	subjects,	eliminating	the	impressive	gains	made	the	previous	two	years.	The	
Philadelphia	miracle	appeared	completely	forced	and	fabricated.	
	 While	the	elimination	of	cheating	seemed	to	contribute	heavily	on	the	
academic	achievement	declines	in	2012,	there	are	other	plausible	alternative	
explanations.	During	the	nine	years	of	test	score	increases,	Philadelphia	schools	also	
experience	nine	years	of	funding	increases.	However,	school	budgets	were	
drastically	cut	at	an	unprecedented	rate	during	the	2011‐2012	school	year—
teachers	were	fired,	extra	curricular	activities	suspended,	and	resources	eliminated.	
Perhaps	the	test	score	decreases	were	simply	the	result	of	Harrisburg	failing	to	
provide	schools	with	enough	resources	to	succeed.		
	 On	the	other	hand,	the	cheating	scandal	had	a	significant	effect	on	
Philadelphia	schools.	Morale	was	at	an	all	time	low,	and	all	schools—flagged	or	
not—were	forced	to	defend	their	credibility	to	the	public.	Teachers	and	
administrators	complained	that	the	intense	security	measures	placed	by	the	State	
and	District	created	a	climate	that	affected	children	on	test	day.		
	 Of	course,	the	most	common	analysis	blamed	schools	themselves	for	the	
declines.	Because	of	the	increased	security	measures,	schools	that	got	away	with	
cheating	in	previous	years	were	forced	to	comply	with	proper	testing	protocol	in	
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2012.	In	this	way,	the	2012	test	scores	showed	Philadelphia’s	true	achievement	for	
the	first	time.		
	 This	study	aims	to	understand	the	context	of	education	policy	leading	up	to	
the	2012	declines	and	statistically	determine	what	caused	them.	Did	cheating	in	
Philadelphia	occur	due	to	something	particular	about	national,	state,	or	local	
education	policy,	or	did	a	minority	of	administrators	misrepresent	test	data	simply	
because	they	had	the	opportunity	to	do	so?	How	much	did	cheating	actually	affect	
student	achievement?	Did	flagged	schools	and	grade	levels	experience	sharper	
declines	than	their	non‐flagged	counterparts?	In	many	of	the	flagged	schools,	certain	
grade	levels	were	not	marked	for	cheating	but	still	received	the	same	level	of	public	
scrutiny	and	security	because	other	grade	levels	in	the	schools	were	flagged.	Did	
these	non‐flagged	grade	levels	in	flagged	schools	experience	similar	declines	to	their	
non‐flagged	counterparts?	Were	patterns	different	between	the	math	and	reading	
tests?		
	 The	qualitative	analysis	portion	in	the	study	finds	that	the	No	Child	Left	
Behind	act—signed	into	law	by	President	Bush	in	2002—is	guilty	of	creating	a	
hostile	environment	in	schools	as	it	placed	too	much	importance	and	influence	on	
high‐stakes	standardized	tests.	The	proficiency	rates	of	students	potentially	
determined	the	job	status	of	teachers	and	administrators	and	inevitably	led	to	
cheating.			
	 On	the	statistical	side,	this	study	finds	that	the	2012	budget	decreases	
experienced	in	Philadelphia	schools	significantly	contributed	to	the	declines	in	test	
scores,	even	when	controlling	for	cheating.	It	also	suggests	that	environmental	
	 9
factors	within	cheating	schools	may	have	contributed	to	the	overall	score	declines,	
since	test	scores	in	non‐flagged	grades	dropped	significantly	more	if	they	were	part	
of	a	flagged	school.	Nevertheless,	the	overall	conclusion	finds	that	even	when	taking	
the	above	findings	in	consideration,	the	elimination	of	massive	cheating	contributed	
significantly	to	the	rapid	decline	in	Philadelphia	test	scores.		
	 The	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	The	first	half	of	the	study	aims	to	present	a	
story	of	the	context	of	the	District	on	the	day	students	took	their	test	in	March	2012.	
Part	II	will	describe	the	existing	theory	on	why	public	school	administrators	cheat	
and	how	cheating	is	connected	to	national	education	policy	initiatives.	Part	III	will	
provide	an	overview	of	the	state	of	education	in	both	Pennsylvania	and	the	School	
District	of	Philadelphia.	Part	IV	will	specifically	focus	on	the	details	of	the	cheating	
scandal	in	Philadelphia.	The	later	half	will	shift	the	paper	from	qualitative	
description	to	quantitative	analysis.	Parts	V	–	VII	will	introduce	the	data	used,	
hypotheses	tested,	and	equations	manipulated.	Part	VIII	will	outline	the	results	from	
statistical	tests	while	Part	IX	will	analyze	the	implications	of	what	the	data	reveals.	
Finally,	Part	X	will	discuss	who	or	what	should	be	blamed	for	the	test	score	declines	
and	what	the	data	reveals	about	the	actions	taken	by	local,	state,	and	national	
education	policy	makers.		
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II.	National	Education	Policy	and	Cheating	Theory	
The	Birth	of	No	Child	Left	Behind	
	 Education	was	firmly	on	the	map	during	the	2000	presidential	election,	and	
the	issues	that	divided	the	candidates	continue	to	split	the	education	debate	today.	
Like	many	presidential	candidates	before	and	after	him,	President	Bush	fought	hard	
to	paint	himself	as	an	education	pioneer	during	the	2000	presidential	campaign.	In	
one	particular	commercial,	his	campaign	claimed	that	“as	president,	George	W.	Bush	
will	challenge	the	status	quo	with	a	crusade	to	improve	education.	He’ll	fight	for	
reforms	hailed	as	the	most	fundamental	in	a	generation.”7	Indeed,	as	Governor	of	
Texas,	Bush	oversaw	reforms	that	The	Economist	claimed	“improved	[educational]	
standards…and	narrowed	the	achievement	gap	between	white	and	non‐white	
students.”8		
	 Bush	was	an	advocate	for	placing	more	accountability	on	schools	and	school	
districts	with	high	stakes	standardized	testing.	The	argument	stated	that	chronically	
failing	schools	did	not	deserve	public	funding	and	parents	had	the	right	to	send	their	
children	to	higher	performing	schools.	Parents	would	make	an	educated	decision	on	
where	to	enroll	their	children	based	on	standardized	test	scores	made	available	to	
the	public.	High	stakes	testing	thus	gave	school	districts	the	incentive	to	perform	
well	while	giving	parents	reliable	school	choices.	If	schools	did	not	make	the	grade,	
this	quasi	market‐based	system	would	lead	them	to	close	while	higher	performing	
schools	would	grow.	
																																																								
7	Rosenbaum,	David.	“The	2000	Campaign:	The	Ad	Campaign;	Bush	on	Education”.	The	New	York	
Times.	March,	18,	2000.		
8	“How	bad	is	Texas,	really?”	The	Economist.	Oct.	19th,	2000.		
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	 On	the	other	side	of	the	political	spectrum,	Democratic	candidate	Al	Gore’s	
proposal	for	reforming	schools	focused	much	more	on	development	rather	than	
punishment.	Under	his	plan,	low	performing	schools	would	receive	a	large	influx	of	
funding	accompanied	by	school	turnaround	experts	who	would	work	with	the	
school	for	at	least	two	years.	If	the	school	continued	to	demonstrate	low	
performance,	only	then	would	staff	turnover	occur.9	Bush’s	accountability‐based	
reform	initiatives	won	out	over	Gore’s	investment‐based	approach	and	Bush	was	
quick	to	implement	his	ideas	in	his	new	office.			
	 One	of	Bush’s	first	presidential	acts	was	to	propose	what	would	become	the	
No	Child	Left	Behind	Act	(NCLB),	“arguably	the	most	far‐reaching	education	policy	
initiative	in	the	United	States	over	the	last	four	decades”.10	Passed	with	bipartisan	
support,	NCLB	created	national	standards	for	growth	in	proficiency	in	math	and	
reading.	The	goal	of	the	act	was	for	every	school	in	the	country	to	meet	100%	
proficiency	in	both	subjects	by	2014.	Each	individual	state	was	allowed	to	create	
their	own	tests,	standards	of	proficiency,	and	targets	for	yearly	growth.	If	a	school	or	
district	met	the	target	proficiency	rate	for	a	given	year,	the	institution	would	meet	
Adequate	Yearly	Progress	(AYP).11	Schools	that	make	AYP	are	granted	greater	
autonomy	with	their	budgets	and	policies.	However,	schools	that	miss	AYP	over	
multiple	consecutive	years	are	forced	to	overhaul	their	school,	which	could	possibly	
mean	conversion	to	a	charter	school	or	complete	staff	turnover.		
																																																								
9	Goldstein,	Andrew.	“Bush	and	Gore:	Who’s	The	Education	President?”.	TIME	Magazine.	Nov.	6,	2000.	
10	Dee,	Thomas	S.,	and	Brian	A.	Jacob.	"The	Impact	of	No	Child	Left	Behind	on	Students,	Teachers,	and	
Schools."	Brookings	Papers	on	Economic	Activity	2010.2	(2010):	149.	
11	Institutions	must	also	met	a	95%	test	participation	target	as	well	as	varying	attendance	and	
graduation	targets,	depending	on	if	the	school	has	a	graduating	class	or	not.	
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	 True	to	its	name,	the	No	Child	Left	Behind	Act	was	the	first	of	its	kind	to	not	
only	stress	accountability,	but	also	emphasize	improvement	for	multiple	student	
subgroups:	white	students,	minority	students,	English	language	learners,	special	
education	students,	and	economically	disadvantaged	students.	An	institution	only	
meets	AYP	if	all	student	groups	of	at	least	40	students	reach	performance	targets.12	
Undoubtedly,	the	No	Child	Left	Behind	Act	created	a	high‐stake	testing	environment	
in	all	fifty	states.		
	 Education	advocates	and	researchers	have	criticized	NCLB	for	a	multitude	of	
reasons,	including	shifting	away	resources	from	other	subjects	not	tested	(social	
studies,	science,	art,	etc.)	and	encouraging	instruction	that	focuses	on	test‐taking	
training	instead	of	valuable	instruction.13	Furthermore,	some	critics	are	skeptical	of	
state‐reported	claims	of	large	proficiency	rate	increases.		
	 One	way	of	analyzing	the	effectiveness	of	NCLB	measures	is	to	look	at	results	
from	low‐stake	testing	assessments	like	the	National	Assessment	of	Educational	
Progress	(NAEP).	The	NAEP	tests	students	every	two	years	on	a	variety	of	subjects	
by	using	the	same	test	nationwide,	making	a	national	proficiency	rate	and	state‐by‐
state	comparisons	possible.	Grades	4th	and	8th	are	tested	on	the	math	and	reading	
NAEPs	with	three	possible	achievement	levels:	Basic,	Proficient,	and	Advanced.	
Basic	students	“denotes	partial	mastery”	of	the	subject	while	Proficient	students	
																																																								
12	There	are	multiple	ways	for	a	subgroup	to	make	a	specific	target,	including	meeting	the	target	
outright,	meeting	the	target	over	a	two‐year	average,	decreasing	the	amount	of	non‐proficient	
students	by	10%,	or	coming	close	enough	to	meeting	the	target	through	any	of	these	measures	that	a	
margin	for	error	surpasses	the	gap	of	success.		
13	Dee	&	Jacob,	“The	Impact	of	No	Child	Left	Behind…”.	Pg.	150.	
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“have	demonstrated	competency	over	challenging	subject	matter”.14		While	there	is	
no	definition,	students	may	also	perform	below	the	Basic	standard.		
	 While	proficiency	rate	on	the	NAEP	have	increased	since	NCLB’s	
implementation	in	2002,	they	are	nowhere	near	the	100%	proficiency	goal	for	2014	
(see	Table	1).	Furthermore,	proficiency	rates	increased	before	NCLB	just	as	much	as	
after.		
Table	1:	Nation‐wide	Proficiency	Rate	on	4th/8th	Grade	Math/Reading	NAEP15	
	 1992	 2003	 2007	 2011	
4th	G.	Reading	 29%	 31%	 33%	 34%	
8th	G.	Reading	 29%	 32%	 31%	 34%	
4th	G.	Math	 18%	 32%	 39%	 40%	
8th	G.	Math	 21%	 29%	 32%	 35%	
	
These	trends	are	not	inline	with	indications	from	several	state‐level	standardized	
tests	that	show	high	proficiency	rates	and	increased	gains.	Pennsylvania	tests	their	
students	using	the	Pennsylvania	System	of	School	Assessment	(PSSA)	tests.	
Proficiency	standards	for	the	PSSA	are	far	behind	standards	set	by	the	NAEP.	For	
example,	over	the	past	three	NAEP	testing	cycles,	proficiency	rates	for	8th	grade	
math	tests	are	significantly	higher	on	the	PSSA	than	on	the	NAEP	(see	Table	2).	The	
difference	between	the	two	tests	has	recently	increased	as	the	2011	PSSA	
proficiency	rate	was	over	twice	as	high	as	the	NAEP	equivalent.	These	lower	
																																																								
14	Definitions	retrieved	from	http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/nathowreport.asp	
15	U.S.	Department	of	Education,	Institute	of	Education	Sciences,	National	Center	for	Education	
Statistics,	National	Assessment	of	Educational	Progress	(NAEP),	1992,	1994,	1998,	2002,	2003,	2005,	
2007,	2009	and	2011	Reading	and	Mathematics	Assessments.	
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proficiency	standards	allow	most	Pennsylvania	districts	and	schools	to	label	
themselves	as	successful.		
Table	2:	Pennsylvania	8th	Grade	Math	Proficiency	Rate	Based	on	PSSA	and	
NAEP16	
	 2007	 2009	 2011	
NAEP	 38%	 40%	 38%	
PSSA	 68%	 71%	 77%	
Difference	 30%	 31%	 39%	
	
	 Pennsylvania	is	certainly	not	alone	in	demonstrating	a	higher	proficiency	
rate	than	the	nationally	administered	NAEP.	In	fact,	all	50	states	had	proficiency	
standards	that	were	lower	than	NAEP’s	standards	in	both	reading	and	math,	with	
the	exception	of	Massachusetts	in	math.17	Those	critical	of	NCLB	state	that	this	gap	
demonstrates	that	proficiency	standards	for	state	tests	mask	true	learning	and	that	
any	real	gains	made	on	these	high	stakes	test	is	a	product	of	teachers	focusing	on	
how	to	take	the	test	itself	rather	than	on	teaching	the	broad	subject	matter	tested.	
Even	with	these	higher	proficiency	rates,	some	districts	and	schools	resorted	to	
other	means	to	boost	their	test	proficiency	rates.	
	
Cheating	Scandals:	Part	of	the	New	American	School	System	
																																																								
16	Ibid.	
PSSA	scores	taken	from	the	Pennsylvania	Department	of	Education	website.	
17	U.S.	Department	of	Education:	Mapping	State	Proficiency	Standards	Onto	the	NAEP	Scales:	
Variation	and	Change	in	State	Standards	for	Reading	and	Mathematics,	2005‐2009.	National	Center	
for	Education	Statistics.	2011.	pg.	14	
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	 A	key	question	in	this	study	will	analyze	the	claim	that	“high‐stakes	testing	
may	lead	school	personnel	to	intentionally	manipulate	student	test	scores.”18	While	
Gore’s	model	of	education	reform	would	have	supported	struggling	schools	and	
teachers,	Bush’s	reform	plan	placed	extremely	high	pressure	on	institutions	to	raise	
test	scores.	As	previously	stated,	schools	that	don’t	meet	AYP	for	multiple	years	in	a	
row	under	No	Child	Left	Behind	must	undergo	swift	transformation	that	often	
includes	hiring	new	teachers	and	administrative	staff.	High	pressure	combined	with	
lax	security	provides	ample	opportunity	for	testing	improprieties.	
	 	Cheating	scandals	that	have	occurred	across	the	country	since	NCLB’s	
inception	have	supported	this	concern	about	manipulation.	For	example,	in	Atlanta,	
a	state	investigation	into	cheating	in	2011	found	that:	
	“cheating	was	caused	by	a	number	of	factors	but	primarily	by	the	
pressure	to	meet	targets	in	the	data‐driven	environment…a	culture	
of	fear,	intimidation	and	retaliation	existed	in	APS	[Atlanta	Public	
Schools],	which	created	a	conspiracy	of	silence	and	deniability	with	
respect	to	standardized	test	misconduct.”19	
	
Over	forty	schools	were	found	guilty	of	cheating.	Thirty‐eight	principals	were	
implicated	while	82	teachers	and	staff	members	confessed	to	misrepresenting	
student	test	score	data.	In	the	Western	half	of	the	country,	10%	of	3,000	Arizona	
teachers	surveyed	claimed	that	they	knew	of	other	teachers	participating	in	
cheating,	including	replacing	incorrect	answers	with	correct	ones	and	refusing	to	
test	low‐performing	students.20	The	DC	Public	School	system,	previously	run	by	
																																																								
18	Dee	&	Jacob.	
19	Resmovits,	Joy.	“Atlanta	Public	Schools	Shaken	By	Cheating	Report”.	The	Huffington	Post.	Sep.	4,	
2011.		
20	Amrein‐Beardsley,	A.;Berliner,	D.C.;	Rideau,	S..	“Cheating	in	the	first,	second,	and	third	degree:	
Educators’	responses	to	high‐stakes	testing”.	Education	Policy	Analysis	Archives.	Vol	18,	No.	14.	2010.		
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Michelle	Rhee,	a	strong	high‐stakes	accountability	advocate,	is	also	currently	under	
investigation	for	testing	irregularities	while	Rhee	was	at	the	helm.21	Other	scandals	
have	occurred	in	Texas,	Ohio,	California,	Chicago,	and	more—all	after	No	Child	Left	
Behind	came	into	effect.22	Cheating	has	occurred	at	such	a	high	frequency,	that	
Diane	Ravitch—former	US	Assistant	Secretary	of	Education	and	leading	education	
advocate—admitted	that	she	has	“never	seen	so	many	cheating	scandals	as	there	
have	been	in	the	last	few	years.”23	Ravitch	believes	the	rise	in	cheating	is	directly	
related	to	the	fact	that	NCLB’s	100%	proficiency	goal	looms	closer	and	closer.	
	 Undoubtedly	these	Districts	and	schools	in	question	had	an	incentive	to	
perform	well	on	tests.	Consistent	negative	results	on	standardize	tests	would	often	
lead	to	the	elimination	of	teachers,	administrators,	and	at	times	entire	schools.	
However,	the	question	of	whether	high‐stakes	testing	is	completely	to	blame	is	
debatable.		
		
Bad	Apples	or	Bad	Policy?	
	 The	question	of	why	cheating	occurs	has	been	heavily	discussed	before	and	
after	NCLB:	is	cheating	the	result	of	a	wayward	minority	trying	to	game	the	system,	
or	do	certain	policies	encourage	and	inevitably	lead	to	corruption?	In	the	context	of	
education	policy,	did	No	Child	Left	Behind’s	high‐stakes	testing	atmosphere	do	more	
																																																								
21	Gillum,	Jack	and	Bello,	Marisol.	:When	standardized	test	scores	soared	in	D.C.,	were	the	gains?”	USA	
Today.	Mar.	30,	2011.	
22	Samuels,	Christina.	“Cheating	Scandals	Intensify	Focus	on	Test	Presures”.	Education	Week.	Aug.	4,	
2011.	
23	Resmovits,	Joy.	“Atlanta	Public	Schools…”	
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harm	than	help	to	students	by	causing	unintended	consequences	like	cheating	by	
educators?		
	 Some	place	the	blame	of	cheating	on	certain	individuals	who	were	given	the	
opportunity	to	do	so.	Professor	Cizek	of	University	of	North	Carolina	at	Chapel	Hill	
assisted	in	the	cheating	investigation	in	Atlanta	public	schools	and	believes	high	
stakes	testing	has	zero	blame	in	all	cheating	scandals.	Cizek	believes	that	“it’s	a	huge	
mistake…to	think	that	the	incentives	to	cheat	in	school	settings	are	fundamentally	
any	different	from	those	in	any	other	context.”24	In	this	argument,	pointing	the	
blame	on	testing	policies	would	be	equivalent	to	sympathizing	with	baseball	players	
who	use	performance‐enhancing	drugs	to	gain	an	advantage	in	a	pressure‐filled	
occupation.	For	Cizek,	cheating	will	always	occur	“as	long	as	important	educational	
decisions	are	informed	in	part	by	test	results,”	but	only	because	the	same	people	
who	“cut	corners”	as	sportsmen,	politicians,	and	journalists	exist	in	all	facets	of	
society—including	education.25		
	 But	how	much	is	the	act	of	cutting‐corners	a	factor	of	one’s	own	behavior	and	
how	much	is	due	to	the	demands	of	a	situation?	Cambell’s	Law	(named	after	social	
scientist	Donald	Campbell)	is	often	used	to	describe	the	relationship	between	
external	pressure	and	corruption:		
The	more	any	quantitative	social	indicator	is	used	for	social	
decision‐making,	the	more	subject	it	will	be	to	corruption	
pressures	and	the	more	apt	it	will	be	to	distort	and	corrupt	the	
social	processes	it	is	intended	to	monitor.26	
	
																																																								
24	Cizek,	Gregory	J.	”Cheating	on	Tests	and	Other	Dumb	Ideas”.	Education	Week.	July	25,	2011.	
25	Ibid.		
26	Anderman,	Eric,	&	Murdock,	Tamera.	Psychology	of	Academic	Cheating.	Elsevier	Academic	Press.	
2007.	Pg.	292.		
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According	to	Eric	Anderman	and	Tamera	Murdock,	Campbell’s	Law	is	applicable	to	
both	the	student	and	teacher	side	of	the	classroom	when	referring	to	the	magnitude	
of	the	weight	attached	to	a	single	measure	of	aptitude	and	competency.	Students	
who	cheat	“do	so	as	a	function	of	the	situations	in	which	they	find	themselves	rather	
than	because	of	some	general	flaw	in	character.”27	Similarly,	teachers	are	pushed	to	
perform	unprofessional	actions	when	policies	exert	unfair	expectations.	The	authors	
find	that	NCLB	“has	sown	seeds	of	corruption	in	a	once	morally	trustworthy,	highly	
respected	profession.”28	Furthermore,	the	declining	trust	of	teachers	and	
administrators	as	a	result	of	cheating	scandals	“is	too	great	a	price	to	pay	for	an	
accountability	system	that	appears	not	to	work.”29	In	their	opinion,	standardized	
tests	should	take	a	Gore‐like	approach	and	be	used	to	foster	development	among	
teachers	and	staff	instead	of	hostility	and	degradation.		
	 Nichols	and	Berliner	take	this	argument	a	step	further	by	forgiving	teachers	
for	certain	types	of	cheating:	
In	some	cases,	cheating	is	difficult	to	condemn.	For	example,	when	
a	teacher	“helps”	a	struggling	student	with	one	or	two	challenging	
test	items,	we	may	view	it	as	a	small	and	forgivable	infraction	when	
compared	to	the	potential	motivational	and	psychological	costs	of	
that	student	failing	another	test.30	
	
The	authors	believe	that	cheating	by	teachers	and	administrators	is	at	worst	morally	
vague	when	not	directly	connected	to	a	teacher’s	personal	motivations	and	gains.	
According	to	Nichols	and	Berliner,	teachers	may	be	looking	out	for	the	best	interests	
of	their	students	when	they	decide	to	participate	in	cheating.	No	Child	Left	Behind	
																																																								
27	Ibid.	pg.	289	
28	Ibid.	pg.	307		
29	Ibid.	pg.	308	
30	Nichols,	Sharon	L.	and	Berliner,	David	C..	Collateral	Damage:	How	High‐Stakes	Testing	Corrupts	
America’s	Schools.	Harvard	Education	Press.	2008.	Pg.	34.		
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puts	teachers	in	a	moral	dilemma	where	they	“may	come	to	the	conclusion	that	
cheating	on	a	test,	like	stealing	unaffordable	medicine	[in	order	to	save	a	dying	
loved	one],	can	be	justified.”31	In	this	case,	it	is	the	national	education	policy	brought	
down	from	Washington	politicians	that	must	answer	for	the	disturbing	trends	of	
cheating	in	school	districts	across	the	country.		
	 As	this	study	delves	deeper	into	the	details	of	the	vast	amounts	of	cheating	
that	occurred	in	Philadelphia,	one	must	consider	the	implications	of	education	
policy	in	the	classroom	and	how	unintended	consequences	can	nullify	good	
intentions.			
	
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
31	Ibid.	pg.	35	
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III.	The	State	of	Education	in	Pennsylvania	and	Philadelphia	
NCLB	In	Pennsylvania:	The	PSSA		
	 Before	No	Child	Left	Behind	was	signed	into	law	in	2002,	Pennsylvania	
already	had	a	statewide	assessment	measure	known	as	the	Pennsylvania	System	of	
School	Assessment,	or	the	PSSA.	Instituted	in	1992,	the	PSSA	test	changed	to	its	
current	form	in	2000.	Pennsylvania	continues	to	use	the	PSSAs	in	accordance	with	
NCLB.	Students	in	grades	3‐8	and	11	take	the	test	every	year	in	math	and	reading.	
Some	of	those	grades	also	take	tests	in	science	and	writing;	however,	these	tests	are	
not	counted	for	AYP	purposes.	Students’	scaled	scores	are	translated	into	four	
categories:	Below	Basic	(“inadequate	academic	performance”),	Basic	(“marginal”),	
Proficient	(“satisfactory”)	and	Advanced	(“superior”).	The	Department	of	Education	
states	that	proficiency	“indicates	a	solid	understanding	and	adequate	display	of	the	
skills	included	in	the	Pennsylvania	Academic	Content	Standards”.32	Students	scoring	
either	Proficient	or	Advanced	are	counted	towards	AYP	targets.	
	 Across	the	entire	state	of	Pennsylvania	in	2012,	74%	of	students	tested	
scored	Proficient	or	above	in	math	while	71%	did	so	in	reading—both	small	
declines	from	the	previous	year	(these	scores	are	roughly	25	percentage	points	
higher	than	Philadelphia’s	rates).	Translated	into	NCLB	and	Adequate	Yearly	
progress	terms,	the	majority	of	the	500	school	districts	and	153	charter	schools	in	
																																																								
32	“Technical	Report	for	the	2012	Pennsylvania	System	of	School	Assessment”.	Data	Recognition	
Corporation.	2012.	pg.	274.	Available	on	the	Pennsylvania	Department	of	Education	website.	
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the	state	made	AYP	in	2012	(58%)	while	91%	have	made	it	within	the	past	two	
years.33		
	 Philadelphia’s	experience	with	No	Child	Left	Behind	has	lagged	behind	
compared	to	the	rest	of	the	state.	Only	three	school	districts	have	failed	to	meet	AYP	
standards	every	year	since	No	Child	Left	Behind’s	inception:	Harrisburg	City,	
Chester	Upland,	and	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia.	Only	seven	schools	(.2%	of	
all	schools	in	the	state)	have	failed	to	make	AYP	every	single	year—everyone	of	
them	in	Philadelphia.	The	label	of	failure	given	to	these	institutions	by	No	Child	Left	
Behind	has	contributed	to	Philadelphia’s	reputation	of	a	crumbling	school	system	
beyond	repair.	Additionally,	as	performance	targets	have	risen	in	anticipation	of	the	
2014	goal,	state	standards	are	becoming	increasingly	unattainable	for	Philadelphia	
schools.	
	 As	the	100%	proficiency	target	in	2014	approaches,	Philadelphia—and	
indeed	the	rest	of	the	state—is	suffering	due	to	the	way	the	state	defined	its	yearly	
targets.	Because	NCLB	allowed	individual	states	to	create	their	own	proficiency	
targets,	Pennsylvania—along	with	several	other	states—took	a	“backloaded”	
approach	to	reaching	the	100%	proficiency	target	in	2014	(See	Table	3).	For	
example,	targets	in	math	rose	21	percentage	points	between	2002	and	2007,	which	
means	proficiency	rates	need	to	rise	55	percentage	points	between	2007	and	2014.	
Some	have	speculated	that	states	took	this	approach	with	the	belief	that	NCLB	
would	be	replaced	by	another	policy	as	the	seemingly	impractical	100%	goal	of	
																																																								
33	Data	taken	from	the	Pennsylvania	Department	of	Education’s	AYP	website:	
http://paayp.emetric.net/StateReport#pie		
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2014	neared.34	While	this	notion	has	come	to	fruition	for	the	majority	of	states	in	
the	form	of	NCLB	waivers	given	by	the	federal	Department	of	Education,	
Pennsylvania	is	one	of	six	states	that	has	yet	to	apply	for	a	waiver	(though	has	plans	
to	do	so	at	the	time	of	this	writing).35		
Table	3:	Pennsylvania	AYP	Proficiency	Targets		
Year	 Math	Proficiency	Target	 Reading	Prof.	Target	
2002	 35%	 45%	
2003	 35%	 45%	
2004	 35%	 45%	
2005	 45%	 54%	
2006	 45%	 54%	
2007	 45%	 54%	
2008	 56%	 63%	
2009	 56%	 63%	
2010	 56%	 63%	
2011	 67%	 72%	
2012	 78%	 81%	
2013	 89%	 91%	
2014	 100%	 100%	
	
																																																								
34	Chudowsky,	Naomi;	Chudowsky,	Victor.	“Many	States	Have	Take	a	‘Backloaded’	Approach	to	No	
Child	Left	Behind	Goal	of	All	Students	Scoring	‘Proficient’”.	Center	on	Education	Policy.	May	19,	2008.	
Pg.	5.	
35	Niederberger,	Mary.	“No	Child	Left	Behind	waiver	to	be	sought	by	Pennsylvania”.	Pittsburgh	Post‐
Gazette.	Nov.	28,	2012.		
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	 The	increased	targets	have	caused	more	pressure	for	schools	deemed	failing	
and	needing	restructuring.	Although	test	scores	across	the	District	rose	in	2011,	the	
number	of	schools	making	AYP	dropped	from	158	schools	to	110	schools	due	to	the	
increase	of	the	target	proficiency	rate.36	Schools	that	fail	to	make	AYP	for	multiple	
years	in	a	row	are	forced	to	restructure—a	move	that	often	leads	to	teacher	and	
administration	turnover.		
	 In	Philadelphia,	the	two	main	routes	of	reform	are	turning	failing	schools	into	
Promise	Academies	or	Renaissance	Charter	Schools;	each	of	these	systems	lead	to	
teacher	and	administration	turn‐over.	Promise	Academies	are	District‐run	schools	
with	extra	resources	that	allow	for	a	longer	school	day,	among	other	things.	The	
Principal	turnover	rate	at	Promise	Academies	is	high.	Whoever	is	named	principal	
must	turnover	more	than	50%	of	teaching	staff.	The	teachers	that	are	not	chosen	to	
stay	are	either	forced‐transferred	to	another	school	or	let	go	by	the	District,	
depending	on	District	availability	and	the	teacher’s	seniority.	Under	the	current	
agreement	between	the	School	District	and	the	Philadelphia	Federation	of	Teachers	
(Philadelphia’s	main	teaching	union),	teachers	are	laid	off	based	on	a	system	of	
seniority:	younger	teachers	are	laid	off	first.	
	 Schools	that	are	restructured	as	Renaissance	Charter	Schools	effectively	turn	
into	a	neighborhood	charter	school:	independently	managed	yet	publicly	funded	
schools	that	must	take	students	from	the	neighborhood	boundaries.	In	this	
situation,	the	hiring	of	teachers	and	administrators	is	completely	out	of	District	
control	and	is	decided	by	whichever	Charter	Management	Organization	(CMO)	runs	
																																																								
36	Only	33	schools	in	the	District	made	AYP	in	2012.	Herold,	Benjamin.	“110	schools	meet	AYP	
targets”	The	Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook.	Aug.	18,	2011.	
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the	school.	Teachers	at	the	school	are	employed	by	the	CMO	(not	the	District),	and	
are	thus	not	unionized.	Because	of	these	factors,	teacher	and	principal	turnover	
rates	are	high.	While	these	turnover	models	both	aim	to	bring	resources	and	new	
perspectives	to	under‐performing	schools,	teachers	and	principals	have	an	incentive	
to	increase	their	students	test	scores	before	their	jobs	can	possibly	be	placed	in	
jeopardy.		
	
The	School	District	of	Philadelphia:	A	History	of	Fiscal	Mismanagement		
	 The	School	District’s	poor	reputation	across	the	state	of	Pennsylvania	derives	
largely	from	recent	tensions	over	fiscal	mismanagement	by	District	administrators.	
The	School	District	has	long	had	a	rocky	relationship	with	the	state	government,	and	
this	was	exacerbated	with	the	creation	of	the	School	Reform	Commission	(SRC)	in	
2001.	The	SRC	was	created	in	a	bargain	between	the	District	and	the	state	
government,	where	the	District	ceded	the	state	greater	control	over	its	governance	
in	exchange	for	more	state	funding.37	What	resulted	was	the	SRC,	a	five‐member	
school	board—three	appointed	by	the	governor	and	two	appointed	by	the	mayor.	
While	the	SRC	would	function	as	a	normal	school	board,	it	allowed	the	State	to	have	
greater	power	over	the	financial	dealings	of	the	School	District	as	well	as	the	
appointment	of	the	Superintendant.	However,	the	power	of	appointing	
superintendants	did	not	eliminate	conflict	between	District	leaders	and	the	SRC.	
	 In	its	first	summer	of	its	existence,	the	SRC	unanimously	appointed	Paul	
Vallas—a	superstar	with	a	reputation	for	fixing	the	public	school	system	in	
																																																								
37	“Who	runs	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia?”.	Education	Voters	of	Pennsylvania.	2013.		
	 25
Chicago—as	Superintendant.38	Vallas	would	go	on	to	spearhead	important	reform	
movements	including	expanding	the	charter	school	system,	creating	smaller	high	
schools,	and	a	$1.7	billion	capital	expansion	plan.39	However,	he	suddenly	lost	
support	from	the	SRC	during	the	2006‐2007	school	year	when	a	$73.3	million	
budget	deficit	surprisingly	arose	from	seemingly	nowhere.40	This	SRC,	apparently	as	
surprised	as	everyone	else,	claimed	that	they	were	“betrayed”	and	“disappointed”	in	
Vallas	in	allowing	such	a	deficit	to	occur.41	Vallas	claimed	that	the	SRC	were	just	as	
much	to	blame	as	he	was	as	they	both	had	the	same	amount	of	access	to	budgetary	
information.42	The	in‐fighting	eventually	led	to	Vallas	leaving	Philadelphia	to	
successfully	lead	public	schools	in	New	Orleans	in	the	summer	of	2007.		
	 Arlene	Ackerman	replaced	Vallas	as	Superintendent	a	year	later	and	created	
her	own	reform	plan	called	Imagine	2014.	The	initiative	called	for	turning	around	
lower	performing	schools	by	either	converting	them	to	charters	or	providing	extra	
funding	with	direct	District	supervision.43	This	part	of	the	plan,	called	the	
“Renaissance	Schools	Initiative”,	along	with	many	other	parts	of	the	plan,	were	
funded	by	federal	stimulus	money	that	was	intended	to	be	used	on	one‐time	
expenditures	instead	of	recurring	programs.44	When	stimulus	funds	ran	dry	and	the	
State	drastically	decreased	Philadelphia’s	funding	in	2011,	Ackerman	and	her	
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administration	were	facing	a	$715	million	budget	shortfall—almost	ten	times	the	
amount	that	had	forced	Vallas	to	leave.45	Ackerman	was	an	extremely	controversial	
and	polarizing	figure	whose	tenure	ended	bitterly	in	August	2011	after	feuds	
between	herself,	the	SRC,	and	Philadelphia	mayor	Michael	Nutter	proved	too	heated	
to	reconcile.46	The	SRC	bought	out	the	rest	of	her	contract	by	paying	her	$905,000	to	
leave	her	post.47		
	
Philadelphia:	Tragically	Underfunded		
	 As	previously	mentioned,	the	School	District	faced	an	unprecedented	budget	
crisis	during	the	2011‐2012	school	year.	While	the	School	District	has	certainly	
suffered	from	internal	financial	mismanagement,	the	financial	neglect	from	the	State	
of	Pennsylvania	has	also	left	the	District	with	fewer	resources	than	were	needed	to	
adequately	educate	their	students.		
	 Like	in	many	other	states,	Pennsylvania	funds	its	schools	through	a	
combination	of	state	funding	and	local	property	tax	revenue.	Because	property	tax	
revenues	are	based	on	the	value	of	the	property	owned	by	residents	within	a	
district’s	boundaries,	wealthier	districts	can	tax	low	to	spend	high	while	poorer	
districts	(such	as	Philadelphia)	must	tax	high	merely	to	spend	low.	Ideally,	basic	
education	funding	from	the	State	reconciles	this	gap.		
	 In	2006,	the	General	Assembly	of	Pennsylvania	commissioned	a	study	to	
determine	how	much	money	the	state	needed	to	fund	their	school	districts	to	
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“provide	an	education	that	will	permit	[students]	to	meet	the	State’s	academic	
standards	and	assessments”.48	The	completed	study,	which	was	released	a	year	
later,	found	that	the	State	was	underfunding	schools	by	$4.57	billion	if	they	wanted	
to	meet	their	achievement	goals.	Specifically,	Philadelphia	needed	a	42%	funding	
increase	from	the	state	to	have	adequate	resources	to	succeed	by	the	states’	
standards.49	In	2008,	Governor	Ed	Rendell	made	a	six‐year	plan	to	close	the	vast	
majority	of	this	gap	by	creating	funding	formulas	that	targeted	poorer	school	
districts	while	dramatically	increasing	basic	education	funding.50	The	2009	
economic	recession	put	a	dent	in	those	plans	as	Rendell	was	forced	to	use	one‐time	
federal	stimulus	money	to	increase	education	funding.	
	 When	Governor	Corbett	came	into	office	in	2011,	the	General	Assembly	
(under	the	advice	of	the	Governor)	decreased	K‐12	basic	education	funding	by	
almost	$900	million	for	the	2011‐2012	Fiscal	Year.51	The	cuts	included	the	loss	of	
federal	stimulus	money	and	the	elimination	of	grants	and	funding	formulas	that	
benefited	poorer	schools.52	Poorer	districts	that	depended	on	the	state	more	for	
funding	lost	much	more	money	per‐pupil	than	wealthier	districts.	For	example,	
while	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia	lost	$533	per‐pupil,	Lower	Merion	School	
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District—just	a	ten‐minute	drive	away—lost	less	than	$20	per‐pupil.53	Although	
Philadelphia	educated	10%	of	the	states’	students,	they	suffered	30%	of	the	basic	
education	funding	cuts.		
	 The	drastic	decreases	in	funding	were	unprecedented	for	Philadelphia	and	
contributed	substantially	to	the	record	$715	million	shortfall.	As	Figure	1	shows,	
Philadelphia	had	not	experienced	a	funding	decrease	in	the	previous	two	decades,	
never	mind	one	so	severe.	The	District	was	forced	to	make	drastic	cuts	to	programs	
and	staffs.	Around	4000	teachers,	nurses,	secretaries,	reading	specialists,	and	other	
personnel	were	let	go.54	Half	of	the	central	office	staff	was	laid	off.55	Twenty‐six	
schools	lost	their	full‐service	kitchens.56	Seven	schools	closed	in	the	summer	of	
2012	while	23	more	will	close	this	summer.57	While	AYP	targets	continue	to	rise	
rapidly	towards	100%	proficiency,	Philadelphia	schools	have	not	been	in	worse	
financial	shape	in	its	long	history.			
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Figure	1:	Pennsylvania	Basic	Education	Subsidy	growth	for	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia,	1992‐201258
																																																								
58	This	chart	was	presented	at	the	August	3rd,	2011	School	Reform	Commission	meeting	by	then	School	District	of	Philadelphia	
Chief	Financial	Officer	Michael	Masch.	Masch,	Michael.	“SDP	Budget	Update:	Changes	Since	Initial	Adoption	on	May	31,	2011”.	
School	District	of	Philadelphia.	August	3,	2011.	Slide	13.	
	 	 	
	
IV.	The	Philadelphia	Schools	Cheating	Scandal	
Erasure	Results	Collect	Dust	
	 Though	the	Philadelphia	schools	cheating	scandal	erupted	in	2011,	evidence	
for	the	scandal	was	available	years	before.	In	the	summer	of	2009,	the	Pennsylvania	
Department	of	Education	paid	the	Data	Recognition	Corporation	(the	company	that	
collects	and	aggregates	data	on	the	PSSA)	$108,000	to	conduct	a	forensic	analysis	on	
the	2009	PSSA	tests.59		The	final	report	included	four	different	statistical	tests	to	
determine	the	“integrity	of	test	results”.60	The	clearest	of	these	four	measures	is	the	
erasure	analysis.		
	 Test	scanners	are	capable	of	determining	if	someone	(a	student	or	
administrator)	changed	a	response	to	a	question	by	erasing	one	answer	choice	and	
filling	in	another	one.	The	Data	Recognition	Corporation	aggregated	the	number	of	
erasures	in	every	reading	and	math	PSSA	taken	by	Pennsylvania	public	school	
students	in	2009.	By	using	the	mean	number	of	wrong‐to‐right	erasures	(erasing	an	
incorrect	answer	and	replacing	it	with	a	correct	one)	the	analysis	flagged	schools	
that	had	suspiciously	high	numbers	of	wrong‐to‐right	erasures	in	specific	grade	
levels.	In	other	words,	if	the	probability	of	a	school’s	wrong‐to‐right	erasures	
occurring	due	to	chance	exceeded	1	in	10,000,	the	school	was	flagged.61	In	the	end,	
225	schools	in	the	state	were	flagged	in	2009,	88	(39%)	of	which	were	in	the	School	
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District	of	Philadelphia.62	Some	Philadelphia	schools	greatly	exceeded	the	minimum	
requirement	for	a	flagged	status.	For	example,	55%	of	Strawberry	Mansion	High	
School	11th	graders	had	suspiciously	high	numbers	of	wrong‐to‐right	erasures	on	
their	2009	Math	PSSAs.	The	likely	hood	of	this	pattern	occurring	by	chance	was	1	in	
10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000—roughly	the	
equivalent	of	winning	the	Mega	Millions	lottery	jackpot	five	times	in	a	row.63	
	 For	reasons	that	are	still	largely	unclear,	the	report	did	not	cause	even	the	
simplest	of	follow‐ups.	The	State	Secretary	of	Education	at	the	time,	Gerald	
Zahorchak,	later	claimed	that	“the	report	never	reached	my	desk…I	don’t	have	any	
idea	why	it	languished.”64	When	the	report	eventually	became	public	in	2011	(under	
a	different	administration),	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia	asserted	that	they	
were	never	informed	of	the	report’s	data.65	The	spokesperson	for	the	Secretary	of	
State	in	2011	summed	up	the	situation	by	stating,	“[the	report]	was	basically	put	on	
the	shelf	and	ignored”.66	No	forensic	analyses	were	completed	after	the	2010	PSSA	
tests	as	the	state	discontinued	them	due	to	budgetary	concerns.		
	
Roosevelt	and	FitzSimons:	The	Calm	Before	the	Storm	
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	 Any	hint	of	cheating	in	Philadelphia	schools	remained	at	a	minimum	until	
May	2011,	when	The	Philadelphia	Inquirer	published	a	story	about	teachers	
anonymously	reporting	cheating	at	Roosevelt	Middle	School	and	FitzSimons	High	
School.67	Before	the	article	was	written,	Roosevelt	was	hailed	as	a	District	success	
story	where	“disadvantaged	students	could	overcome	enormous	challenges	to	
realize	their	full	potential.”68	Under	then‐Principal	Stefanie	Ressler,	Roosevelt	
increased	proficiency	rates	by	over	50%	in	both	Math	and	Reading	between	2008	
and	2010.	At	a	Principal’s	meeting	in	2010,	Ressler	was	singled	out	by	
Superintendent	Arlene	Ackerman	and	Governor	Ed	Rendell	for	her	
accomplishments.69	As	described	in	this	paper’s	introduction,	Ressler	herself	
commented,	“if	you	think	miracles	can’t	happen,	look	at	us.”70	In	the	summer	of	
2011,	Ressler	was	reassigned	to	Wilson	Middle	School,	“considered	a	better	
assignment”	as	Wilson	is	a	high	achieving	school.71	
	 Several	teachers	at	Roosevelt	contacted	The	Inquirer	and	detailed	multiple	
test‐security	violations.	According	to	their	accounts,	“answers	[were]	written	on	a	
blackboard…senior	staff	encourag[ed]	teachers	to	drill	certain	concepts	they	knew	
appeared	on	the	exam,”	and	students	“with	test	booklets	and	answer	sheets	out	
[were]	engaged	in	conversation	with	the	principal.”72	The	School	District	began	an	
internal	investigation,	which	included	interviews	with	several	teachers	at	the	
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school.	One	teacher	commented,	“what	we	all	said	[of	Ressler	and	Roosevelt]	was	
pretty	damning”.73		
	 FitzSimons	High	School	also	had	a	teacher	come	forward	to	The	Inquirer	to	
report	wrong‐doings	at	their	school.	The	teacher	walked	into	the	newsroom	with	a	
copy	of	two	PSSA	exams	that	would	be	administered	to	students	the	following	day—
a	clear	violation	of	a	policy	that	states	test	booklets	must	be	“kept	under	lock	and	
key”	until	the	day	of	the	exam.74	Furthermore,	administrators	allegedly	asked	
teachers	to	look	through	tests	and	coach	students	on	specific	topics	or	problems	
that	they	knew	would	be	tested.		
	 On	July	7,	2011,	the	School	District	concluded	its	investigation	and	stated	that	
“allegations	of	state	test‐score	cheating	at	[Roosevelt	and	FitzSimons]	were	
unfounded.”75	
	 	
Cheating	Scandal	Unravels		
	 Finally,	two	years	after	the	original	publication	of	the	erasure	analysis	report,	
the	details	of	the	cheating	scandal	were	released	to	the	public.	Presumably	as	a	
result	of	The	Inquirer’s	reports,	another	publication—The	Philadelphia	Public	School	
Notebook—asked	the	Pennsylvania	Department	of	Education	(PDE)	in	May	2011	if	
they	had	a	history	of	commissioning	forensic	analyses	of	PSSA	tests.	“To	our	
surprise,”	The	Notebook’s	Paul	Socolar	would	later	comment,	“we	received	a	wealth	
																																																								
73	Graham,	“Phila.	District	rejects	claims”	
74	Graham	&	Purcell,	“City	school’s	fast‐rising	test	scores	questioned”.	
75	Graham,	“Phila.	District	rejects	claims”	
	 34
of	statistical	information	regarding	the	2009	test	administration.”76	The	PDE	staff	
member	who	responded	to	The	Notebook	“apparently	[was	not]	fully	aware”	that	he	
handed	over	the	2009	erasure	analysis	report.77		On	July	8th,	just	a	day	after	the	
District	found	no	wrongdoing	at	Roosevelt,	The	Notebook	released	the	erasure	
analysis	report	and	its	implications	to	the	public.	Roosevelt	was	flagged	for	
suspicious	erasures	in	2009	for	both	grade	levels	that	they	tested	in	reading	and	
math.	The	probability	that	the	school’s	7th	grade	reading	erasure	marks	occurred	by	
chance	was	1	in	100	trillion.78	
	 PDE	Secretary	Ronald	Tomalis	quickly	ordered	forensic	analyses	from	PSSA	
tests	conducted	in	2010	and	2011.79	After	analyzing	the	forensic	data	from	all	three	
years	(2009‐2011),	the	state	derived	new	criteria	for	flagging	schools	and	focused	
their	investigations	to	53	schools	in	Philadelphia.	The	Data	Recognition	
Corporation’s	analyses	had	led	to	88	schools	marked	for	suspicious	erasures	in	
Philadelphia	for	2009	alone.	For	unknown	reasons,	the	State	later	flagged	a	school‐
grade‐subject	combination	if	“at	least	10	percent	of	student	response	sheets	had	five	
or	more	wrong‐to‐right	erasures”,	according	to	The	Notebook	(the	average	test	sheet	
has	less	than	one).80	It	is	likely	that	the	State	dropped	investigations	for	schools	
flagged	originally	in	2009	that	did	not	show	suspicious	trends	in	either	2010	or	
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2011.	Although	PDE	initially	stated	that	the	2010	and	2011	forensic	analyses	
reports	would	be	released	to	the	public,	the	data	are	still	confidential	in	what	has	
turned	into	a	secretive	investigation.81		
	 The	School	District	worked	to	increase	test	monitoring	at	all	of	its	250	
schools	(non‐charters).	While	training	and	monitoring	increased	at	all	schools,	
special	focus	was	given	to	the	53	state‐flagged	schools.	During	2012	PSSA	testing,	
staff	from	the	Office	of	Accountability	monitored	flagged	schools	directly;	at	some	
schools,	“testing	material	[was]	limited”	to	these	central	office	employees.82		
Furthermore,	PDE	prohibited	teachers	from	proctoring	the	PSSAs	to	their	own	
students—a	measure	only	given	to	Philadelphia.83	The	State	and	the	District	
intended	the	identity	of	the	53	flagged	schools	to	remain	unknown;	however,	just	
days	before	students	took	the	2012	PSSA	tests	for	reading	and	math,	the	Inquirer	
released	and	widely	publicized	the	names	of	all	53	schools.84	
	 	
The	Bottom	Line	
	 When	the	dust	cleared	and	the	2012	PSSA	test	results	were	finally	released	in	
September	of	2012,	Philadelphia	schools	saw	overall	declines	for	the	first	time	in	
nine	years	(see	Figure	2).	Scores	declined	for	every	grade	level	and	student	
demographic	group	for	both	reading	and	math.	The	next	parts	of	this	study	aim	to	
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84	Graham,	Kristen;	Purcell,	Dylan.	“’Compelling’	evidence	of	cheating	in	many	Phila.	Schools”.	The	
Philadelphia	Inquirer.	Mar.	11,	2012.		
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shed	light	on	the	statistical	relationships	between	a	variety	of	variables	and	the	
declines.		
	
	
Figure	2:	PSSA	Scores	for	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia	(2002‐2
	
012)
	 	 	
	
V.	Data	
	 The	data	used	in	this	study	can	be	placed	in	three	separate	categories:	test	
score	data,	school	information	data,	and	cheating	data.	
	
Test	Score	Data	
	 PSSA	test	proficiency	rates	on	the	district,	school,	and	school‐grade	level	are	
available	to	the	public.	Test	data	from	2011‐2012	school	year	is	available	in	the	
form	of	detailed	charts	and	tables	on	Pennsylvania’s	AYP	website	
(http://paayp.emetric.net).	Test	data	going	back	to	the	1995‐1996	school	year	is	
available	on	the	Pennsylvania	Department	of	Education’s	website.		
	 This	study	analyzes	test	scores	from	2007‐2012	for	all	246	District‐run	
schools	in	Philadelphia	for	both	reading	and	math	in	order	to	compare	scores	across	
schools	before,	during,	and	after	proven	testing	irregularities	took	place.		Test	
scores	were	collected	on	the	school	level	and	on	the	school‐grade	level.	For	example,	
Samuel	Powel	Elementary	School	(K‐4),	has	only	two	tested	grades	(grades	3	and	4).	
On	the	school	level,	Powel’s	combined	proficiency	rates	for	all	tested	grades	are	
taken	into	account.	On	the	school‐grade	level,	changes	in	scores	within	specific	
grades	from	year	to	year	are	analyzed	(i.e.	Grade	3	reading	scores	in	2011	compared	
to	Grade	3	reading	scores	in	2012).	For	high	schools,	proficiency	rates	on	the	school	
and	school‐grade	level	are	equivalent	as	Grade	11	is	the	only	tested	grade.	
Pennsylvania	tests	grades	3‐8	and	11	every	year	for	reading	and	math.		
	
School‐Specific	Data	
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	 School	information	included	in	this	study	includes	budget	data,	enrollment	
data,	and	AYP	status.	
	 Yearly	school	budgets	from	2009	to	2012	were	collected	from	the	School	
District	of	Philadelphia’s	website.	The	School	District	lists	each	school’s	funding	
allotment	into	three	categories:	full‐time	staff	subsidy,	non‐full	time	subsidy,	and	
per‐teacher	allotment	subsidy.	This	study	uses	the	combined	total	of	these	three	
subsidies.	Also	included	is	the	change	in	budgets	from	year	to	year.	Principal	data	
from	2009‐2011	was	similarly	attained	from	the	School	District’s	website.	
Table	4:	Summary	Statistics	of	School	Budgets	
	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	
Budget		
(Mean,	N	=	246)	 $4,589,385	 $4,887,915	 $5,081,875	 $4,397,290	
$	Change	in	
Budget	
(Mean,	N=	246)	
	 +$298,530	 +$193,969	 ‐$684,584	
%	Change	in	
Budget		
(Mean,	N	=	246)	
	 +6.42%	 +5.01%	 ‐14.09%	
		
	 Note	that	while	test	score	data	was	available	in	the	school	and	school‐grade	
level,	budget	data	in	this	study	is	limited	to	the	school	level.	Furthermore,	the	focus	
on	this	study	is	limited	to	District‐run	public	schools	in	Philadelphia.	Thus,	charter	
schools—public	schools	that	are	independently	run—are	not	considered.		
	
Cheating	Scandal:	Flagged	School	and	Grade	Levels	
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	 The	data	on	which	schools	and	grade	levels	within	schools	were	flagged	for	
cheating	came	from	The	Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook,	which	published	the	
details	of	the	investigation	last	August.85	As	previously	stated,	53	schools	are	
currently	under	investigation	for	having	suspiciously	high	erasure	markings	on	
PSSA	tests	for	multiple	grades/subjects	between	2009‐2011.		
	 As	discussed	in	the	following	sections,	these	schools	have	a	wide	variety	of	
percentage	of	grade	levels	that	are	flagged	(see	the	Appendix	(pg.	86)	for	a	
comprehensive	list	of	schools	and	grade	levels	flagged).	Some	schools,	such	as	
Roosevelt	Middle	School,	were	flagged	in	every	grade‐subject‐year	category	
possible.	Since	Roosevelt	tested	two	grades	(7th	and	8th)	over	three	years	(2009‐
2011)	in	two	subjects	(reading	and	math),	they	had	twelve	opportunities	to	receive	
flags.	Table	10	in	the	Appendix	lists	every	school	under	investigation	for	cheating	as	
well	as	which	grade‐subject‐year	combinations	were	flagged.	Blacked	out	cells	
indicate	that	those	grades	are	not	tested	at	the	specific	schools.	Schools	are	sorted	
first	by	school	type	(elementary,	middle,	and	high	school)	and	then	by	alphabetical	
order.		
			 On	school	level	analyses,	even	though	schools	had	differing	number	of	flags	
within	their	grade	levels,	they	are	each	treated	the	same	under	the	subset	of	flagged‐
schools.	When	the	Inquirer	released	the	names	of	the	53	schools	before	the	start	of	
2012	PSSA	testing,	they	did	not	release	the	details	listed	in	the	Table	10—only	the	
names.	Treating	flagged	schools	as	one	category	allows	the	study	room	to	separate	
																																																								
85	“Suspicious	erasure	patterns	at	53	schools”.	The	Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook.	Aug.	16,	
2012.	
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the	effects	of	decreases	due	to	the	elimination	of	cheating	and	decreases	due	to	a	
negative	climate	at	the	publicly	shamed	and	privately	monitored	53	schools.		
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VI.	Hypotheses	
	 This	study	aims	to	test	five	main	hypotheses	about	the	nature	of	the	2012	
PSSA	test	score	declines	in	Philadelphia.	
	
#1:	Test	scores	in	flagged	schools	will	drop	by	a	greater	amount	than	test	
scores	in	non‐flagged	schools		
	 Strong	evidence	of	testing	irregularities	was	found	at	53	District‐run	schools.	
Increased	security	and	monitoring	was	placed	on	these	schools	in	an	attempt	to	
curb	this	cheating.	Since	the	cheating	likely	led	to	an	artificial	inflation	of	test	scores,	
the	elimination	of	such	cheating	should	have	led	to	flagged	schools	having	larger	
proficiency	rate	decreases	than	non‐flagged	schools.		
	
#2:	Test	scores	will	drop	by	a	greater	amount	in	those	schools	that	received	a	
greater	reduction	in	funding	between	2011	and	2012	
	 The	massive	District	budget	cuts	in	2012	affected	all	District‐run	schools.	
Because	school	budgets	directly	affect	the	amount	of	resources	a	school	can	attain	
and	many	of	those	resources	are	connected	to	student	achievement	(class	sizes,	a	
healthy	and	safe	school	environment,	etc.),	the	change	in	funding	in	2012	for	a	
specific	school	should	be	directly	connected	to	the	change	in	test	scores.	Schools	
that	had	significant	decreases	in	their	budgets	should	have	lower	test	scores.		
	
#3:	Within	a	flagged	school,	test	scores	in	flagged	grades	will	drop	more	than	
in	non‐flagged	grades	
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	 While	some	flagged	schools	had	100%	of	their	grades	flagged	for	all	three	
years,	most	schools	had	some	grades	that	did	not	show	suspicious	erasure	
markings.	Theoretically,	because	cheating	occurred	in	these	schools	in	the	flagged	
grades,	test	scores	in	these	flagged	grades	should	drop	by	more	than	in	the	non‐
flagged	grades.	
	
#4:	Across	non‐flagged	grades,	test	scores	will	drop	by	more	in	flagged	schools	
than	in	non‐flagged	schools	
	 While	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	did	not	experience	an	
elimination	of	cheating	that	occurred	in	flagged	grades	in	the	same	school,	they	still	
experienced	the	same	increased	security,	monitoring,	and	public	scrutiny	because	
they	were	part	of	a	flagged	school.	On	another	note,	while	non‐flagged	grades	had	no	
suspicious	erasure	marks	in	previous	tests,	they	might	have	taken	advantage	of	
other	cheating	methods	(coaching,	answer‐pointing,	pre‐test	reveals)	not	accounted	
for	in	the	erasure	analysis.	For	these	two	reasons,	these	“clean”	grade	levels	at	
“dirty”	schools	should	have	experienced	a	sharper	drop	in	test	scores	than	grade	
levels	at	non‐flagged	schools.	
	
#5:	A	change	in	principal	will	cause	change	in	the	percentage	of	flagged	grades	
in	a	school	
	 This	hypothesis	aims	to	test	the	notion	that	administrators	(not	just	
individual	teachers)	were	at	fault	for	the	cheating	occurring	at	the	53	flagged	
schools.	If	the	amount	of	cheating	at	a	school	is	connected	to	the	person	in	charge,	
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then	a	change	in	leadership	should	lead	to	a	higher	or	lower	percentage	of	grades	
flagged	(depending	on	the	incoming	or	outgoing	principal).	
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VII.	Research	Design	
	 These	hypotheses	will	be	tested	in	four	separate	steps:	a	pictorial	analysis,	
regression	analyses	on	the	school	level,	regression	analyses	on	the	school‐grade	
level,	and	a	detailed	look	at	how	a	change	in	principal	affected	the	percentage	of	
flagged	grades	in	a	flagged	school.	
	 The	pictorial	analysis	will	show	quantitatively	how	scores	dropped	in	flagged	
schools	in	2012	compared	to	non‐flagged	schools.	Then	on	the	school‐grade	level,	
the	study	will	focus	on	three	flagged	schools	and	show	how	flagged	grades	scores	
dropped	compared	to	non‐flagged	grades.	Whilst	these	graphs	and	figures	will	show	
absolute	differences	between	flagged/non‐flagged	schools/grades,	the	conclusions	
drawn	from	them	are	limited	because	of	the	small	amount	of	variables	present.	For	
example,	simple	graphs	and	figures	cannot	distinguish	between	the	effects	of	
cheating	and	budget	cuts	on	the	declining	proficiency	rate.		Multivariate	regressions,	
however,	can	isolate,	for	example,	the	effects	of	cheating	by	controlling	for	several	
other	variables.	
	 Regressions	are	used	in	statistical	analyses	as	a	means	to	understand	the	
effect	that	one	variable	has	on	a	dependent	variable	while	holding	constant	the	
other	variables	included	in	the	regression.	In	this	study,	the	dependent	variables	are	
a	school’s	(or	school‐grade‐level’s)	proficiency	rates	in	math	and	reading.	The	
independent	variables	used	in	this	study	include	the	school	year,	the	percent	change	
of	budget,	flagged	status,	and	specific	school	or	school‐grade	level.	A	regression	will	
produce	a	numerical	coefficient	for	each	independent	variable	that	describes	how	
the	independent	variable	affects	the	dependent	variable	(proficiency	rate),	
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essentially	creating	a	“best‐fit”	line	equation	for	a	multi‐dimensional	graph.	The	
more	uncorrelated	independent	variables	that	are	added	to	the	equation,	the	more	
each	coefficient	accurately	describes	the	true	relationship	between	the	independent	
and	dependent	variables.		
	 Fixed	effects	are	included	as	explanatory	variables	to	control	for	the	
differences	in	test	scores	across	schools	that	are	constant	across	time	and	the	
differences	in	test	scores	across	years	that	are	constant	across	schools.	For	example,	
when	year‐fixed	effects	are	included,	every	single	school	year	has	its	own	coefficient	
attached	to	it.	Similarly,	when	school‐fixed	effects	are	used,	each	school	is	used	as	a	
separate	independent	variable	with	its	own	coefficient.		Each	of	these	independent	
variables	is	only	relevant	to	the	school	and	school	year	tested	that	corresponds	to	
them.	When	these	fixed	effects	are	added,	the	significance	of	other	coefficients,	such	
as	one	that	relates	to	a	school’s	flagged	status,	is	much	higher.	This	allows	for	
stronger	conclusions,	for	example,	on	how	cheating	and	the	elimination	of	cheating	
affected	schools’	proficiency	rates.																																												
	 The	regression	tests	used	in	this	study	are	described	below,	whilst	the	
numerical	values	of	the	coefficients	are	revealed	in	the	next	section.	Each	test	
equation	is	listed	before	discussing	its	relation	to	the	hypotheses	of	the	previous	
section.	Fixed	effects	and	coefficients	are	written	in	italics	whilst	their	
corresponding	independent	variables	are	written	in	normal	text.	Sometimes	these	
independent	variables	also	contain	specific	identifiers	to	demonstrate	which	schools	
they	apply	to.	Consider	the	following	part	of	Test	#1’s	regression	equation	for	an	
explicit	explanation:	
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	(Flagged	School	Drop	in	2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	Indicator)*(Year	==	
2012)	
The	independent	variable	in	this	case	is	Flagged	Schools	in	2012,	as	the	coefficient	
only	applies	to	flagged	schools	(Flagged	School	Indicator)	if	the	test	was	taken	in	
2012	(Year	==	2012).	The	coefficient	will	demonstrate	how	much	more	scores	
dropped	in	flagged	schools	than	in	non‐flagged	schools	because	it	only	applies	to	
flagged	schools.		
	 Each	regression	will	contain	a	baseline	constant	that	applies	to	all	schools	(or	
school‐grade	levels).	Unexplained	factors	account	for	the	gaps	in	predicted	
proficiency	rates	from	the	regressions	and	actual	proficiency	rates	experienced.	The	
first	seven	tests	pertain	to	variables	that	affect	a	schools’	proficiency	rate,	while	the	
last	test	aims	to	shed	light	on	the	possible	perpetrators	of	cheating.		
	
School	Level	Regressions	
	 Using	the	following	equation,	the	first	test	will	use	schools’	scores	from	2007‐
2012	and	find	a	relationship	between	a	school’s	proficiency	rates	and	whether	or	
not	the	school	was	flagged	for	cheating.	
	
Test	1:	
School	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effects)	+	(Flagged	School	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	
Indicator)	+	(Flagged	School	Trend)*(Flagged	School	Indicator)*(Year	–	2012)	+	
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(Flagged	School	Drop	in	2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)		
+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 The	year	fixed	effect	will	account	for	year‐to‐year	fluctuations	in	proficiency	
rates	(e.g.	the	general	rise	in	test	scores	between	2007‐2011	and	the	general	decline	
in	2012	will	be	controlled).	The	next	three	coefficients	will	only	apply	to	the	53	
flagged	schools.	The	Flagged	School	coefficient	applies	to	all	53	flagged	schools	
regardless	of	the	year	(If	a	school	is	flagged,	the	Flagged	School	Indicator	equals	1,	
otherwise,	0).	The	Flagged	School	Trend	coefficient	will	demonstrate	how	much	
more	flagged	school’s	scores	increased	over	time	before	2012.	A	positive	coefficient	
signifies	that	the	gap	between	proficiency	rates	in	flagged	schools	and	non‐flagged	
schools	increased	every	year	before	2012.		The	Flagged	School	Drop	in	2012	
coefficient	only	applies	to	the	53	flagged	schools	if	the	test	was	taken	in	2012,	the	
year	of	the	declines.	To	isolate	the	effects	of	being	a	flagged	school	in	2012,	the	
Flagged	School	coefficient	will	be	added	to	the	Flagged	School	in	2012	coefficient.		
Thus,	this	equation	should	show	how	much	advantage	flagged	schools	had	during	
the	time	cheating	was	found	(2009‐2011),	but	should	also	show	how	much	more	
they	declined	in	2012	compared	to	non‐flagged	schools	(testing	Hypothesis	#1).		
	
Test	2:	
School	Proficiency	Rate	=		
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Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effects)	+	(Flagged	School	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	
Indicator)	+	(Flagged	School	Drop	in	2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	
Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)		+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 Test	#2	is	very	similar	to	Test	#1.	In	anticipation	of	Test	#3,	this	test	will	only	
include	scores	from	2011	and	2012.	Because	only	two	years	are	accounted	for,	the	
Flagged	School	Trend	coefficient	is	excluded.	Like	the	previous	test,	Hypothesis	#1	is	
relevant	as	the	combination	of	the	two	Flagged	School	coefficients	will	reveal	how	
much	flagged	school’s	scores	dropped	compared	to	non‐flagged	schools	in	2012.		
	
Test	3:	
School	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effects)	+	(Flagged	School	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	
Indicator)	+	(Flagged	School	Drop	in	2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	
Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)		+	(Change	in	Budget	Coefficient)*(Percent	Change	in	
Budget)	+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 Test	#3	adds	one	crucial	factor	to	the	school	level	regression	equations:	the	
percent	change	in	budget	from	the	previous	year.	The	test	will	only	use	scores	and	
budgets	changes	in	2011	and	2012	to	focus	on	the	effects	in	the	last	year.		Since	the	
test	includes	separate	coefficients	for	budget	changes	and	cheating	status,	
Hypothesis	#1	and	#2	will	be	analyzed	using	the	results.		
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School‐Grade	Level	Regressions	
	 To	test	hypotheses	#4	and	#5,	proficiency	rates	must	be	analyzed	on	the	
school	grade	level	instead	of	just	the	aggregate	school	results.	Using	test	scores	
aggregated	for	each	grade	level	at	all	District	run‐schools—along	with	the	flagged	
status	for	each	grade	in	the	53	flagged	schools	(see	Appendix)—the	following	
regressions	should	reveal	more	details	about	how	cheating	in	2011	affected	schools	
in	2012.	
	
Test	#4:	
School‐Grade	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effects)	+		(School	Fixed	Effects)	+	(2011	Flagged	Grade	
Coefficient)*(Flagged	Grade	Indicator)	+	(2011	Flagged	Grade	in	2012	
Coefficient)*(Flagged	Grade	Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)	+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 As	in	the	previous	tests,	Year	Fixed	Effects	are	included.	The	School	Fixed	
Effects	are	included	in	this	analysis	because	proficiency	rates	in	schools	between	
grades	and	tested	years	are	likely	similar	and	strongly	correlated.	Having	a	
coefficient	for	every	school	examined	in	the	analysis	controls	for	this	effect.	Because	
this	study	aims	to	focus	on	the	drops	in	scores	between	2011	and	2012	with	an	
emphasis	on	allegedly	cheating	schools,	the	regression	tests	will	contain	predictive	
coefficients	for	grades	flagged	in	2011	only.	As	in	the	previous	tests,	the	score	
change	in	2012	for	grades	flagged	in	2011	will	be	the	sum	of	the	2011	Flagged	Grade	
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and	2011	Flagged	Grade	in	2012	coefficients.	Test	#4	will	only	analyze	data	from	
2011	and	2012.		
	
Test	#5:	
School‐Grade	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effect)	+		(School‐Grade	Fixed	Effect)	+	(2011	Flagged	Grade	in	
2011	Coefficient)*(Flagged	Grade	Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)	+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 Instead	of	controlling	for	similar	scores	within	schools,	Test	#5	controls	for	
similar	schools	within	school‐grade	combinations.	For	example,	Roosevelt	Middle	
School	has	a	separate	fixed	coefficient	for	Grade	7	and	Grade	8.	This	more	precise	
test	uses	scores	from	2007‐2012.	
	
Test	#6:		
School‐Grade	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effect)	+		(School‐Grade	Fixed	Effect)	+	(Flagged	School	
Coefficient)*(Flagged	School	Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)	+	(2011	Flagged	Grade	in	
2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	Grade	Indicator)*(Year	==	2012)	+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 Test	#6	adds	one	more	variable	from	Test	#5:	the	school’s	flagged	status.	
This	allows	differentiation	between	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	and	non‐
flagged	grades	in	non‐flagged	schools	(Hypothesis	#4).	This	test	will	use	scores	from	
2007‐2012.	
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Test	#7:		
School‐Grade	Proficiency	Rate	=		
Constant	+	(Year	Fixed	Effect)	+		(School‐Grade	Fixed	Effect)	+	(School	Fixed	Effect	in	
2012)	+	(2011	Flagged	Grade	in	2012	Coefficient)*(Flagged	Grade	Indicator)*(Year	
==	2012)	+	Unexplained	Factors	
	
	 Test	#7	uses	another	measure	to	control	for	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	
schools	(Hypotheses	#4).	Instead	of	adding	a	flagged	school	coefficient,	this	test	
adds	a	fixed	effect	for	schools	specifically	for	2012.	Thus,	for	tests	taken	in	2012,	all	
school‐grade	proficiency	rates	have	a	baseline	coefficient	along	with	the	School‐
Grade	Fixed	Effect.		
	
Change	in	Principal	Regression	
	 The	last	regression	test	will	attempt	to	discover	if	principals	may	have	
directly	participated	in	cheating.	The	effect	of	a	change	in	principal	on	the	
percentage	of	flags	in	a	school	will	be	tested	with	a	regression	with	only	one	
dependent	variable.	
	
Test	#8:	
Change	in	Percentage	of	Flags	=	(Change	in	Principal	Coefficient)	+	Constant	
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Note	that	the	change	in	percentage	of	flags	will	be	a	positive	value	and	can	represent	
both	a	decrease	and	an	increase	in	flags.	What	this	test	will	show	is	whether	a	
change	in	principal	from	the	previous	year	led	to	a	significant	change	in	flags	in	
either	direction.	Significant	effects	would	imply	that	some	administrations	may	
carry	their	cheating	habits	to	other	schools.	For	example,	if	a	cheating	principal	
leaves	a	flagged	school	in	2011,	then	the	percentage	of	flagged	grades	should	
decrease.	The	school	that	receives	the	cheating	principal	would	then	experience	a	
rise	in	percentage	of	flagged	grades.	
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VIII.	Results	
Pictorial	Evidence		
	 Graphs	of	the	test	score	data—disaggregated	by	cheating	status—can	
provide	hints	on	what	the	statistical	tests	will	find.	As	shown	in	Figure	2	at	the	end	
of	Part	IV,	PSSA	test	scores	drastically	declined	in	Philadelphia	in	2012.	Math	
proficiency	rates	dropped	8.7	percentage	points	while	reading	proficiency	rates	
dropped	7.1	percentage	points.	One	way	to	predict	if	cheating	was	indeed	the	cause	
of	this	decline	is	to	separate	out	the	scores	of	the	flagged	schools	and	the	non‐
flagged	schools.	Figure	3	below	shows	such	a	disaggregation.		
	 Between	2007‐2011,	the	non‐flagged	schools	(dotted	lines)	made	steady	
gains	in	proficiency	rates	in	both	reading	and	math.	Meanwhile,	flagged	schools	
(solid	lines)	made	significant	gains	in	2009	and	moderate	to	no	gains	in	2010	and	
2011.	Thus,	after	the	2011	PSSA	test,	flagged	schools’	proficiency	rates	were	11.4	
percentage	points	higher	in	math	and	7.1	points	higher	in	reading.		
	 The	2012	test	saw	steep	declines	for	both	sets	of	schools,	but	the	flagged	
schools	experienced	a	much	steeper	decline.	Flagged	schools’	proficiency	rates	
dropped	an	astonishing	22.0	percentage	points	in	math	and	17.7	points	in	reading,	
compared	to	a	6	point	drop	in	math	and	5	point	drop	in	reading	for	non‐flagged	
schools.	The	drop	was	so	severe	in	flagged	schools	that	their	proficiency	rates	were	
around	5	points	lower	than	non‐flagged	schools	in	2012	for	both	subjects.		
	 	 	
	
Figure	3:	Philadelphia	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(%)	by	Cheating	Status	(2007‐2012)	
	 	 	
	
	 Yet	this	school‐level	analysis	does	not	tell	the	whole	story	of	the	elimination	
of	cheating	in	flagged	schools.	This	significant	decrease	in	flagged	schools	could	
have	been	due	to	the	elimination	of	cheating	practices	or	other	factors	connected	to	
the	public	label	of	being	a	“flagged”	school.	For	example,	perhaps	the	increased	
monitoring	that	occurred	at	flagged	schools	created	a	climate	that	was	detrimental	
to	a	testing	environment.	These	latter	factors	would	theoretically	affect	the	entire	
school—all	grades,	all	subjects.	However,	several	schools	were	only	flagged	for	
certain	subjects	and	grades.	Looking	closer	at	these	schools	can	shed	light	onto	the	
causes	of	these	decreases	by	isolating	flagged	grades/subjects	at	specific	schools.		
	 One	way	to	analyze	these	school	specific	cases	is	to	isolate	the	non‐flagged	
and	flagged	grades	within	a	flagged	school	and	examine	the	decreases	in	2012	for	
each	category.	For	the	purposes	of	this	part	in	the	study,	a	grade	is	considered	
“flagged”	if	50%	or	more	of	its	testing	windows	were	flagged	for	irregularities	
between	2009‐2011	(for	math	and	reading).		
	 For	example,	in	Disston	Elementary,	the	flagged	grades	are	3rd,	4th,	and	6th	
grade	while	the	non‐flagged	grades	are	5th,	7th,	and	8th	grade	(see	table	below).		
	
Table	5:	Disston	Elementary	School	Flags,	2009‐2011	
	 Grade	3	 Grade	4	 Grade	5	 Grade	6	 Grade	7	 Grade	8	
Subject	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R	
2009	 Y	 	 Y	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2010	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	 	 	 Y	 	 	 	 	
2011	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	 	 	 Y	 Y	 	 	 	 	
Flagged	
Grade?	 YES	 YES	 NO	 YES	 NO	 NO	
	
The	schools	used	in	this	analysis	include	Disston	Elementary,	Kelly	Elementary,	and	
John	Marshall	Elementary,	shown	in	the	Figures	below.	
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	 Because	different	grade	levels	have	separate	tests	and	standards	of	
proficiency,	the	magnitude	of	declines	within	grade	levels	is	more	important	than	
the	declines	between	grade	levels.	Disston	Elementary’s	flagged	grades’	(3rd,	4th,	and	
6th	grade)	math	proficiency	rates	dropped	23.5%	(17.9	percentage	points)	in	2012,	
compared	to	a	19.0%	drop	(10.3	percentage	points)	in	non‐flagged	grades	(5th,	7th,	
and	8th	grades).	The	difference	in	declines	is	much	more	pronounced	in	Disston’s	
reading	scores,	where	flagged	grades	dropped	29.8%	(19.7	percentage	points)	in	
2012,	compared	to	a	tiny	.4%	drop	(.2	percentage	points)	in	non‐flagged	grades	(See	
Figure	4).	
	 Similar	differences	are	found	in	Kelly	Elementary	(Figure	5),	where	flagged	
grades	(3rd	and	4th)	dropped	29.3%	in	math	and	34.9%	in	reading	in	2012	while	
non‐flagged	grades	(5th	and	6th)	only	dropped	18.2%	in	math	and	1.0%	in	reading.		
	 At	John	Marshall	Elementary	(Figure	6),	a	K‐5	school,	proficiency	rates	in	
flagged	grades	(3rd	and	4th)	declined	36.5%	in	math	and	39.5%	in	reading	in	2012.	
The	only	non‐flagged	grade,	5th	grade,	still	declined	sharply	in	2012,	but	not	with	the	
same	magnitude	as	Marshall’s	flagged	grades:	19.8%	in	math	and	28.8%	in	reading.		
	 The	results	from	three	schools—ideal	examples	of	institutions	where	alleged	
cheating	only	occurred	in	specific	grades	and	classrooms—imply	that	while	scores	
sometimes	dropped	significantly	in	all	grades	of	a	flagged	school,	the	drops	were	
steeper	in	those	grades	that	contained	previous	evidence	of	testing	improprieties.	
	 	 	
	
Figure	4:	Disston	Elementary	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(%)	by	Flagged/Non‐Flagged	Grades	(2009‐2012)
		
	
	
	
	 Grade	3	 Grade	4	 Grade	5 Grade	6 Grade	7 Grade	8
Subject	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R M R M R M R
2009	 Y	 	 Y	 	 	
2010	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	 Y
2011	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	 	 Y Y
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Figure	5:	Kelly	Elementary	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(%)	by	Flagged/Non‐Flagged	Grades	(2009‐2012)	
	
	
	
	
	 Grade	3	 Grade	4	 Grade	5 Grade	6
Subject	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M	 R M R
2009	 Y	 Y	 	 	 	
2010	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	
2011	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 	
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Figure	6:	Marshall,	J.	Elementary	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(%)	by	Flagged/Non‐Flagged	Grades	(2009‐2012)	
	
	 Grade	3	 Grade	4	 Grade	5
Subject	 M	 R	 M	 R	 M R
2009	 Y	 	 Y	 Y	 Y
2010	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
2011	 Y	 Y	 	 Y	
	 	 	
	
School	Level	Regression	Analyses	(See	Table	6)	
	 Test	#1	shows	that	a	flagged	school’s	proficiency	rates	were	generally	15.3	
percentage	points	higher	in	Math	(p<.01)	and	10.8	points	higher	in	Reading	(p<.01)	
in	comparison	to	non‐flagged	schools.	(The	p‐value	for	this	test	indicates	that	the	
probability	of	such	a	relationship	occurring	by	chance	is	less	than	1%.	Generally,	
tests	are	considered	statistically	significant	if	the	p‐value	is	less	than	.05.)	
Furthermore,	between	2007‐2011,	the	gap	between	flagged	and	non‐flagged	schools	
rose	by	2.60	points	in	Math	(p<.01)	and	1.98	points	in	Reading	(p<.01)	every	year.	
Thus,	the	overall	flagged	school	effect	for	Math	was	an	increase	of	2.3	points	in	2007	
(15.3	+	(‐5*	2.60)),	4.9	points	in	2008	(15.3	+	(‐4*	2.60)),	and	so	on.	In	2012,	the	
combined	effect	for	flagged	schools	is	a	4.63	percentage	point	decline	in	Math	(p<.1)	
and	a	5.64	point	decrease	in	Reading	(p<.05)	compared	to	non‐flagged	schools.		
	 Test	#2,	which	only	analyzes	proficiency	rates	in	2011‐2012,	shows	similar	
results.	In	2011,	flagged	schools’	proficiency	rates	were	10.9	percentage	points	
higher	in	Math	(p<.01)	and	6.76	points	higher	in	Reading	(p<.05)	than	non‐flagged	
schools.	In	2012,	flagged	school’s	proficiency	rates	were	5.11	points	lower	in	Math	
(p<.1)	and	5.97	points	lower	in	Reading	(p<.05)	compared	to	non‐flagged	schools.			
	 Test	#3	is	the	same	test	as	Test	#2	except	it	includes	a	change‐in‐budget	
effect.	The	change	in	budget	coefficient	shows	that	a	100%	decrease	in	school	
budgets	would	lead	to	a	46.4	point	drop	in	Math	(p<.01)	and	a	55.1	point	in	Reading	
(p<.01).	In	more	practical	terms,	for	every	1%	decrease	in	budget	that	a	school	
experiences,	their	proficiency	rates	decrease	by	.464	points	in	Math	and	.551	points	
in	Reading.	Even	when	controlling	for	budget	differences,	the	combined	2012	
	 	 	
	
Table	6:	School	Level	Regression	Analyses	on	Philadelphia	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(Tests	#1‐#3)	
Subject	 Math	(%	Proficient	or	Advanced	on	PSSA)	 Reading	(%	Proficient	or	Advanced	on	PSSA)	
Test	#	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	
Years	Included	 2007‐2012	 2011‐2012	 2011‐2012	 2007‐2012	 2011‐2012	 2011‐2012	
Year	Fixed	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Flagged	School	 15.282	(2.863)***	
10.903	
(2.928)***	
11.398	
(2.895)***	
10.800	
(2.638)***	
6.761	
(2.644)**	
7.349	
(2.629)***	
Flagged	School	X	
Year	==	2012	
‐19.915	
(2.002)***	
‐16.009	
(1.952)***	
‐15.944	
(1.951)***	
‐16.439	
(1.923)***	
‐12.726	
(1.766)***	
‐12.647	
(1.827)***	
Flagged	School	X	
(Year	–	2012)	
2.597	
(.475)***	 	 	
1.976	
(.478)***	 	 	
%	Decrease	in	School	Budget	 	 	 ‐46.380	(10.524)***	 	 	
‐55.074	
(10.173)***	
Constant	 46.276	(1.556)***	
48.917	
(1.491)***	
55.332	
(2.298)***	
42.087	
(1.486)***	
45.216	
(1.444)***	
52.834	
(2.208)***	
Combined	Flagged	School	Effect	in	2012 ‐4.633*	 ‐5.106*	 ‐4.546*	 ‐5.639**	 ‐5.965**	 ‐5.298**	
Observations	 1464	 492	 492	 1464	 492	 492	
R‐squared	 0.06	 0.08	 0.11	 0.04	 0.06	 0.10	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
*	significant	at	10%	level;	**	significant	at	5%	level;	***significant	at	1%	level	
	
	 	 	
	
Flagged	School	effect	saw	decreases.	Interestingly,	even	when	controlling	for	budget	
decreases,	this	test	shows	that	flagged	schools	in	2012	had	proficiency	rates	4.471	
points	lower	in	Math	(p>.1)	and	5.206	points	lower	in	Reading	(p<.05)	compared	to	
non‐flagged	schools.		
	
School‐Grade	Level	Regression	Analyses	(See	Table	7)	
	 Test	#4—which	controls	for	the	fact	that	schools	will	demonstrate	similar	
scores—shows	that	in	the	2011	PSSA	tests,	a	grade	that	was	flagged	in	2011	
experienced	proficiency	rates	that	were	14.9	percentage	points	higher	in	Math	
(p<.01)	and	13.2	points	higher	in	Reading	(p<.01)	compared	to	grades	not	flagged	in	
2011.	For	the	2012	tests,	proficiency	rates	for	grades	flagged	in	2011	were	4.5	
points	lower	in	Math	(p<.05)	and	8.5	points	lower	in	Reading	(p<.01)	compared	to	
non‐flagged	grades.		
	 Test	#5	uniquely	controls	for	similar	scores	experienced	within	grade	levels	
of	the	same	school.	Using	scores	from	2007‐2012,	this	test	shows	that	for	the	2012	
tests,	a	grade	flagged	in	2011	performed	13.6	percentage	points	worse	in	Math	
(p<.05)	and	14.4	points	in	Reading	(p<.01).		
	 Test	#6	shows	the	difference	in	scores	between	flagged	grades	in	flagged	
schools,	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools,	and	non‐flagged	grades	in	non‐
flagged	schools.	For	the	2012	PSSA	tests,	grade	levels	that	belonged	to	one	of	the	53	
flagged	schools	but	were	not	flagged	themselves	(in	2011)	scored	11.5	percentage	
points	lower	in	Math	(p<.01)	and	9.45	in	Reading	(p<.01)	compared	to	non‐flagged	
grades	in	non‐flagged	schools.	On	the	same	2012	tests,	grades	that	were	flagged	in	
	 	 	
	
Table	7:	School‐Grade	Level	Regression	Analyses	on	Philadelphia	PSSA	Proficiency	Rates	(Tests	#4‐#7)	
Subject	 Math	(%	Proficient	or	Advanced	on	PSSA)	 Reading	(%	Proficient	or	Advanced	on	PSSA)	
Test	#	 4	 5	 6	 7	 4	 5	 6	 7	
Years	Included	 2011‐2012 2007‐2012 2007‐2012 2011‐2012	 2011‐2012 2007‐2012 2007‐2012 2011‐2012
Year	Fixed		 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
School	Fixed		 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	
School‐Grade	Fixed		 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
School‐2012	Fixed		 No	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	
Flagged	School	Tested	X		
Year	==	2012	 	 	
‐11.460	
(1.666)***	 	 	 	
‐9.447	
(1.619)***	 	
2011	Flagged	Grade		 14.865	(1.637)***	 	 	 	
13.208	
(2.281)***	 	 	 	
2011	Flagged	Grade	X	Year	==	2012	 ‐19.346	(2.409)***	
‐13.578	
(2.493)**	
‐3.295	
(2.631)	
‐4.423	
(2.445)*	
‐21.626	
(2.354)***	
‐14.413	
(2.437)***	
‐6.266	
(2.435)**	
‐8.496	
(2.401)***
Constant	 29.817	(0.299)***	
36.843	
(.576)***	
36.668	
(.586)***	
31.101	
(15.582)**	
25.547	
(0.260)***	
26.676	
(.492)***	
26.486	
(.501)***	
33.703	
(14.519)**
Combined	Flagged	Grade	Effect	in	2012	 ‐4.481**	 	 ‐14.755***	 	 ‐8.418***	 	 ‐15.713***	 	
Observations	 1940	 5708	 5708	 1940	 1940	 5708	 5708	 1940	
R‐squared	 0.76	 0.77	 0.78	 0.92	 0.71	 0.80	 0.81	 0.93	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
*	significant	at	10%	level;	**	significant	at	5%	level;	***significant	at	1%	level	
	 	 	
	
2011	performed	3.30	points	lower	in	Math	(p>.1)	and	6.27	points	lower	in	Reading	
(p<.05)	than	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools.	Compared	to	non‐flagged	grades	
in	non‐flagged	schools,	grades	flagged	in	2011	performed	14.8	points	worse	in	Math	
(p<.01)	and	15.7	points	worse	in	Reading	(p<.01).		
	 Test	#7,	which	has	school	fixed	effects	for	2012,	shows	that	for	the	2012	
tests,	grades	flagged	in	2011	scored	4.42	percentage	points	lower	in	proficiency	for	
Math	(p<.1)	and	8.50	points	lower	in	Reading	(p<.01)	than	grades	not	flagged	in	
2011	(regardless	of	their	school’s	flagged	status).			
	
Principal	Analysis	
	 For	both	2010	and	2011,	if	a	flagged	school	changed	principals	from	the	
previous	year,	they	experienced	a	17.4%	change	in	the	percent	of	grades	flagged	
(see	Table	8).	This	could	mean	either	a	17.4%	increase	or	decrease	as	this	analysis	
only	calculated	the	absolute	value	of	the	change	in	percentage	of	grades	flagged.	
	
Table	8:	Regression	Analysis	of	Change	in	Flagged	Grades	on	Change	in	
Principal	
	 Change	in	%	grades	flagged	
Change	in	Principal	 17.378	(6.093)***	
Constant	 20.622	(2.367)***	
Observations	 106	
R‐squared	 .07	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
*	significant	at	10%	level;	**	significant	at	5%	level;	***significant	at	1%	level	
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IX.	Analysis	
	 Almost	all	of	the	results	described	in	the	above	section	support	each	of	the	
five	hypotheses	listed	in	Part	VI	with	statistical	significance.		
	
#1:	Test	scores	in	flagged	schools	will	drop	by	a	greater	amount	than	test	
scores	in	non‐flagged	schools		
	 Figure	3	clearly	shows	that	in	absolute	terms,	flagged	schools	dropped	by	a	
much	wider	margin	than	non‐flagged	schools	in	2012.		Test	#s	1‐3	on	Table	6	show	
that	the	decline	in	proficiency	rates	in	flagged	schools	in	2012	(Flagged	School	in	
2012	coefficient)	was	anywhere	from	12	to	20	percentage	points	higher	than	non‐
flagged	schools	(statistically	significant	with	at	least	99%	confidence).	Test	#3	
shows	these	results	even	after	accounting	for	drastic	budget	decreases.	In	absolute	
terms,	flagged	schools’	proficiency	rates	dropped	so	drastically	that	reading	scores	
were	statistically	significantly	lower	in	flagged	schools	than	in	non‐flagged	schools	
in	2012.	This	can	also	be	seen	in	Table	6	as	flagged	schools	in	both	subjects	
performed	worse	than	their	non‐flagged	counterparts	(though	the	gap	was	not	
statistically	significant	for	Math	for	Test	#s	1‐3).		
	
#2:	Test	scores	will	drop	by	a	greater	amount	in	those	schools	that	received	a	
greater	reduction	in	funding	between	2011	and	2012	
	 Test	#3	found	a	statistically	significant	link	between	a	decrease	in	school	
budgets	and	a	decrease	in	proficiency	rates	for	both	subjects.	Specifically,	a	1%	
decrease	in	budgets	corresponds	to	a	.464	proficiency	rate	drop	in	Math	and	.551	
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drop	in	Reading	(both	significant	with	over	99%	confidence).	In	the	2012	school	
year,	the	average	District	school	experienced	a	budget	decrease	of	14.09%	(See	
Table	4	above).	Thus,	the	data	imply	that	budget	decreases	in	2012	led	to	a	mean	
drop	of	6.536	percentage	points	in	the	Math	proficiency	rate	and	7.761	percentage	
points	in	the	Reading	proficiency	rate	(after	controlling	for	schools’	flagged	status).		
	
#3:	Within	a	flagged	school,	test	scores	in	flagged	grades	will	drop	more	than	
in	non‐flagged	grades	
	 Test	#s	4‐7	all	show	that	flagged	grades	dropped	more	(except	Math	results	
in	Test	#7)	than	non‐flagged	grades.	Specifically,	Test	#s	4	and	5	demonstrate	that	
flagged	grades	dropped	more	than	non‐flagged	grades	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
the	non‐flagged	grade	belonged	to	a	flagged	school.			
	 The	hypothesis	that	directly	compares	flagged	and	non‐flagged	grades	within	
flagged	schools	was	tested	by	Test	#s	6‐7,	with	2011	Flagged	Grade	in	2012	the	key	
coefficient.	While	the	Math	results	show	that	flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	
decreased	by	3‐4.5	percentage	points	more	than	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	
schools,	the	results	are	not	significant	at	the	95%	confidence	level	(Test	#7	is	
significant	at	the	90%	level).	The	Reading	results	are	statistically	significant	and	
show	that	flagged	grades	dropped	around	6.0	to	8.5	percentage	points	more	than	
non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools.		The	Readings	results	strongly	support	
Hypothesis	#3	while	the	Math	results	are	inconclusive.		
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#4:	Across	non‐flagged	grades,	test	scores	will	drop	by	more	in	flagged	schools	
than	in	non‐flagged	schools	
	 Test	#6	specifically	looks	at	this	hypothesis	as	the	Flagged	School	Tested	in	
2012,	when	isolated,	shows	how	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	performed	in	
comparison	to	non‐flagged	grades	in	non‐flagged	school.	On	the	2012	math	test,	
proficiency	rates	for	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	declined	11.460	
percentage	points	more	than	in	non‐flagged	grades	in	non‐flagged	schools	(p<.01).	
On	the	reading	test	for	the	same	year,	proficiency	rates	declined	9.447	more	points	
in	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	than	in	non‐flagged	grades	in	non‐flagged	
schools	(p<.01).		
	 The	results	of	the	two	previous	hypotheses	beg	the	question:	why	did	a	
school’s	flagged	status	affect	a	grade‐level’s	proficiency	rates	much	more	than	a	
grade‐level’s	own	flagged	status?	One	possible	suggestion	points	to	the	effect	of	test	
monitors	and	public	shaming.		Increased	test	security	measures	were	placed	at	all	
District‐run	schools;	however,	flagged	schools	received	increased	attention	
including	testing	monitors	that	patrolled	the	hallways	and	looked	into	tested	
classrooms.	As	mentioned	in	Part	IV,	the	Philadelphia	Inquirer	released	the	names	of	
the	53	flagged	schools	right	before	the	2012	PSSA	tests	were	administered.	Did	
either	(or	both)	of	these	occurrences—through	intimidation	or	by	some	other	
means—affect	staff	and	students	enough	on	test	day	that	scores	were	lowered?		
	 A	more	pessimistic	explanation	points	at	the	method	of	flagging	grades.	The	
sole	measure	for	flagging	grades	consisted	of	a	suspiciously	high	number	of	wrong‐
to‐right	erasure	markings.	This	method	had	no	way	of	finding	other	possible	
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methods	of	cheating.	It	is	possible	that	flagged	schools	employed	multiple	means	of	
cheating,	and	only	the	flagged	grades	used	erasure	markings	while	the	non‐flagged	
grades	used	other	means.	These	other	methods	would	then	be	discouraged	by	
monitoring	in	2012	the	same	way	as	erasure	markings	were.	The	next	section	of	this	
study	will	discuss	other	possible	ways	of	cheating	in	more	detail.		
	 It	is	unclear	why	results	are	generally	more	significant	in	Reading	than	in	
Math.	Amongst	the	53	flagged	schools,	the	2012	declines	in	Reading	and	Math	were	
nearly	identical.	On	the	school‐grade	level,	out	of	the	189	total	flagged	grade‐subject	
combinations	in	2011,	the	majority	of	them	(110	combinations	or	58.2%)	were	
flagged	in	Math.	Therefore,	a	lack	of	cheating	data	is	not	to	blame.	The	difference	in	
significance	implies	that	in	the	testing	room,	a	school’s	cheating	status	affected	each	
subject	differently.	If	teachers	and	administrators	were	able	to	more	easily	cheat	in	
ways	other	than	erasing	wrong	answers	in	the	math	test,	than	perhaps	a	non‐
flagged	grade	in	math	decreased	just	as	much	as	a	flagged	grade	in	math	because	
cheating	was	eliminated	in	both	grades,	though	only	recorded	in	the	one	with	
suspicious	erasure	markings.	Alternatively,	perhaps	the	“stigma”	of	cheating	that	
existed	in	the	publicly	named	53	flagged	schools	affected	students	more	when	
taking	the	Math	test	than	when	taking	the	Reading	test.	Without	further	research,	
analysis,	and	concrete	data,	the	difference	between	effects	of	a	“flagged	status”	on	a	
specific	subject	test	is	up	for	speculation.		
	
#5:	A	change	in	principal	will	cause	change	in	the	percentage	of	flagged	grades	
in	a	school	
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	 Test	#8	shows	strong	support	for	this	hypothesis,	and	the	results	suggest	that	
top	administrators	may	have	had	a	role	in	the	cheating	that	allegedly	occurred	at	
flagged	schools.	A	principal	may	have	brought	in	or	out	their	cheating	habits	when	a	
principal	change	occurred.		
	 One	extreme	example	comes	from	Edward	Penn’s	principal	career	(Table	9).	
Penn	was	principal	at	Thurgood	Marshall	Elementary	during	the	2008‐2009	and	
2009‐2010	school	year.	Because	of	the	impressive	gains	in	proficiency	rates	that	he	
oversaw	at	T.	Marshall,	Penn	was	promoted	and	then	placed	in	charge	of	Clemente	
Middle	School,	a	Promise	Academy,	in	the	2010‐2011	school	year.86	The	State’s	
erasure	analysis	of	PSSA	tests	from	2009‐2011	revealed	multiple	flags	within	grade	
levels	at	Marhsall	during	Penn’s	tenure.	However,	during	the	first	year	of	testing	
after	Penn	left,	Marshall	received	no	flags.	Before	Penn	arrived	at	Clemente,	the	
school	was	innocent	of	testing	improprieties	in	the	eyes	of	the	state.	Upon	Penn’s	
arrival,	75%	of	grade‐subject	combinations	were	flagged	for	suspiciously	high	
erasure	marks.		
Table	9:	Schools	led	by	Edward	Penn	with	Grades	Flagged,	2009‐2011	
Grade	
Levels	 		 3rd	 4th	 5th	 6th	 7th	 8th	 Percentage	Flagged	 Principal
Schools	 Year	 M	 R	 M	 R M R M R M R M R
Marshall,	
T.	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 Y	 Y Y	 		 		 		 58.3%	 Penn
10	 Y	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 33.3%	 Penn
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	 Other
Clemente	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	 Other
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	 Other
11	 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y Y	 Y Y	 Y 		 		 75.0%	 Penn
	
																																																								
86	Herold,	Benjamin;	Mezzacappa,	Dale.	“District	promoted	principals	from	schools	under	suspicion	
for	cheating.”	The	Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook.	Sep.	18,	2012.	
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	 Penn	is	certainly	not	the	only	case	where	a	school’s	flags	disappeared	after	a	
principal	left.	The	data	in	no	way	proves	that	Penn	himself	orchestrated	cheating,	
though	it	strongly	suggests	that	some	characteristic	of	his	administration	fostered	
testing	improprieties.	While	the	statistics	from	Test	#8	and	these	case	studies	prove	
no	wrongdoing,	they	strongly	suggest	that	the	problems	from	alleged	cheating	
emanate	from	multiple	levels	of	school	leadership.		
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X.	Discussion:	Limitations	and	the	Blaming	Game	
Limitations	
	 This	study	could	be	improved	with	higher	quality	data.	PSSA	classification	
rates	(Below	Basic,	Basic,	Proficient,	and	Advanced)	are	based	on	students’	scaled	
scores.	For	example,	a	3rd	grade	student	earning	a	1181	scaled	score	on	the	Math	
test	would	be	considered	Proficient	while	the	same	student	with	a	1179	scaled	score	
would	be	Basic.	Because	these	somewhat	arbitrary	cut	scores	are	of	extreme	
importance	yet	yield	few	similarities	between	students	just	below	or	above	them,	
using	scaled	scores	instead	of	proficiency	rates	would	led	to	more	precise	
conclusions	on	the	trends	of	scores	from	year	to	year.	Although,	because	each	
subject	level	test	has	different	cut	off	scores	for	every	tested	grade	level,	a	school‐
level	analysis	would	not	be	possible	as	scaled	scores	aren’t	comparable	between	
grades.		
	 Erasure	data	analysis	is	also	incomplete.	The	Philadelphia	Public	School	
Notebook	released	a	detailed	school‐grade	level	analysis	on	2009	erasure	analyses	
when	the	broke	the	cheating	scandal	in	2011.	In	2009	alone,	88	schools	had	
suspiciously	high	erasure	marks.	The	State	then	conducted	similar	analyses	for	
2010	and	2011,	and	in	the	end	53	schools	were	flagged	for	further	investigation	
encompassing	2009‐2011.	The	State	has	refused	to	release	the	erasure	analyses	for	
2010	and	2011.	How	did	88	schools	in	2009	turn	into	53	schools	in	2009‐2011?	Did	
the	state	eliminate	schools	on	the	2009	list	because	they	didn’t	reappear	on	the	
2010	or	2011	lists?	Or	did	they	pick	and	choose	the	53	flagged	schools	by	some	
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other	means?	Without	this	knowledge,	the	credibility	of	a	schools’	flagged	status	is	
slightly	in	doubt.	
	 Furthermore,	presumably	the	state	(and	District)	also	have	more	detailed	
erasure	analysis	that	would	reveal	which	specific	classrooms	had	suspicious	erasure	
markings	and	which	students’	tests	were	used.	Tracking	cheating	data	on	this	
deeper	level	would	yield	stronger	and	more	meaningful	results.	Unfortunately,	only	
the	school	and	school‐grade	level	analyses	are	available	to	the	public	as	the	
investigations	are	still	ongoing.		
	
The	Blaming	Game	
	 The	finger‐pointing	for	who	or	what	caused	the	2012	test	score	declines	can	
start	from	the	highest	levels	of	education	policy	and	move	down.	Did	high‐stakes	
testing	legislated	by	national	politicians	create	an	environment	that	led	to	cheating?	
Or	did	Governor	Corbett	and	the	Pennsylvania	General	Assembly	inevitably	cause	
the	declines	with	massive	education	budget	cuts	that	they	orchestrated?		What	
about	the	external	effects	such	as	monitoring	and	public	scrutiny	that	affected	the	
entirety	of	flagged	schools,	even	grade	levels	not	flagged	for	cheating?		Or	should	the	
blame	rest	solely	on	those	administrators	who	actually	conducted	the	cheating?	
While	there	is	plenty	of	blame	to	rightly	pass	around,	cheating	undoubtedly	
occurred	at	Philadelphia	schools	and	those	responsible	have	yet	to	face	any	kind	of	
repercussions.		
	
High	Stakes	Testing	and	No	Child	Left	Behind	
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	 No	Child	Left	Behind	deserves	credit	for	being	the	first	national	law	of	its	
kind	to	pay	attention	to	the	academic	achievement	of	all	student	subgroups,	
including	minority	subgroups,	economically	disadvantaged	students,	English	
language	learners,	and	special	education	students.	However,	the	unrealistic	
expectation	for	meeting	100%	proficiency	by	2014	has	caused	a	hostile	
environment	in	school	reform	where	schools	are	publicly	labeled	“failures”	if	they	
fail	to	meet	increasing	academic	targets.	To	try	and	avoid	these	labels,	states	and	
school	districts	alike	implement	quick‐fix	reform	initiatives	that	often	lead	to	drastic	
turnaround	of	teachers	and	staff.	Teachers	and	principals	are	thus	left	with	the	
prospect	of	losing	their	jobs	if	they	don’t	improve	test	proficiency	rates	by	a	
significant	margin	year	after	year.	The	incentive	to	manipulate	test	scores	may	then	
overcome	the	desire	to	naturally	improve	students’	academic	achievement.—as	the	
case	has	been	in	Philadelphia,	Atlanta,	Washington	DC,	and	other	major	urban	
school	districts.		
	 The	successes	touted	by	high‐stakes	testing	and	NCLB	advocates	are	often	
misleading.	As	previously	discussed,	every	single	state	has	lower	proficiency	
standards	on	their	standardized	tests	than	the	national	standards	used	in	the	
National	Assessment	of	Educational	Progress	tests	(with	the	exception	of	
Massachusetts).	While	49	out	of	50	states	reported	that	over	50%	of	their	4th	
graders	were	proficient	in	Math	in	2009,	the	NAEP	tests	found	that	all	states	were	
under	this	threshold.		
	 Not	only	are	the	high	proficiency	rates	a	myth,	but	gains	made	between	years	
are	also	fabricated	by	teaching	to	the	test,	testing	improprieties,	and	other	factors.	
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For	example,	the	PSSA	proficiency	rate	in	Philadelphia	for	8th	Grade	math	increased	
by	6.1	percentage	points	between	2009	and	2011	(50.5%	to	56.4%).	According	to	
NAEP	results,	during	that	time	the	Philadelphia	8th	grade	math	proficiency	rate	only	
rose	by	2	percentage	points	(16%	in	2009,	18%	in	2011).87	Are	Philadelphia’s	8th	
graders	truly	increasing	their	achievement	in	math,	or	are	they	merely	learning	test‐
taking	techniques	more	from	teachers	or	improving	due	to	soft	and	hard	forms	of	
administration	cheating?	
	 When	it	inevitably	arrives,	the	next	national	education	reform	legislation	
should	take	note	at	the	successes	and	failures	of	NCLB.	High	expectations	should	not	
be	abandoned	for	the	sake	of	practicality	and	hurting	feelings;	however,	legislation	
should	create	incentives	for	teachers	and	administrators	to	work	for	their	students	
by	supporting	troubled	schools	and	taking	into	account	the	different	out‐of‐school	
factors	that	students	may	bring	in.		
	 Unfortunately,	the	current	rhetoric	of	education	reform	is	going	in	the	
opposite	direction.	The	Obama	Administration	has	granted	states	No	Child	Left	
Behind	waivers	if	and	only	if	the	states	develop	a	teaching	evaluation	system	that	is	
directly	connected	to	student	performance	(among	other	stipulations).88		The	notion	
has	good	intentions	but	may	lead	to	further	cheating	if	there	is	too	much	stress	on	
student	achievement	on	these	evaluations	and	if	professional	development	is	not	
prioritized.	Multiple	studies	show	that	out‐of‐school	factors	such	as	poverty	account	
																																																								
87	U.S.	Department	of	Education,	Institute	of	Education	Sciences,	National	Center	for	Education	
Statistics,	National	Assessment	of	Educational	Progress	(NAEP),	2009	and	2011	Mathematics	
Assessments.	
88	White,	Jeremy.	“Education	Reform:	As	Obama	Pushes	for	Teacher	Evaluations,	Little	Agreement	on	
How.”	International	Business	Times.	Oct.	28,	2011.		
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for	the	majority	of	test	score	variations	while	differences	in	teacher	quality	account	
for	around	10%	of	student	achievement.89	A	comprehensive	teacher	evaluation	
system	must	keep	these	statistics	in	mind	or	else	teachers	will	be	overburdened	
with	the	task	of	overcoming	poverty	completely	on	their	own.	Only	evaluations,	
professional	development,	strong	leadership,	and	adequate	financial	support	can	
level	the	playing	field.	One	wonders	how	the	outlook	of	public	education	would	look	
today	if	Gore	and	his	educational	vision	had	won	the	2000	election.			
	
Budget	Cuts	from	Governor	Corbett	and	the	PA	General	Assembly	
	 The	2011‐2012	budget	cuts	for	basic	education	were	a	significant	factor	in	
the	decline	of	proficiency	rates.	By	Pennsylvania’s	own	standards,	schools	in	the	
state	are	drastically	underfunded—by	over	$4.5	billion	according	to	the	Costing‐Out	
commissioned	by	the	General	Assembly	and	released	in	2007.	Pennsylvania	slashed	
funding	by	almost	$1	billion	for	the	2011‐2012	school	year,	and	Philadelphia	
received	the	brunt	of	these	cuts	as	special	funding	formulas	that	target	areas	with	
higher	poverty	concentrations	were	eliminated.		
	 Governor	Corbett	called	these	cuts	part	of	a	“reality‐based	budget”	to	reign	in	
excessive	spending	from	previous	governors.90	Yet	there	were	many	possibilities	to	
make	room	in	his	budget	for	a	less	hurtful	cut	to	education.	Corbett	turned	down	the	
																																																								
89	Hanushek,	Eric	A.;	Kain,	John	F.;	Rivkin,	Steven	G..	“Teachers,	Schools,	and	Academic	Achievement.	
National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research.	Aug.	1998		
Berliner,	David.	“Poverty	and	Potential:	Out‐of‐School	Factors	and	School	Success”.	The	Great	Lakes	
Center	for	Education	Research	&	Practice.	March	2009.	
Goldhaber,	Dan.	“The	Mystery	of	Good	Teaching”.	Education	Next.	Spring	2002.	Vol.	2,	No.	1.		
Ravitch,	Diane.	“The	Myth	of	Charter	Schools”.	The	New	York	Review	of	Books.	Nov.	11,	2010.		
90	Olsen,	Laura;	Mauriello,	Tracie.	“Corbett’s	state	budget	plan	cuts	$866	million”.	Pittsburgh	Post‐
Gazette.	Mar.	9,	2011.		
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opportunity	to	tax	the	gas	derived	from	the	recently	discovered	Marcellus	Shale	due	
to	fears	of	scaring	away	business.	He	also	refused	to	spend	a	penny	of	the	$785	
million	revenue	surplus,	instead	saving	it	for	a	“rainy	day”.91	Meanwhile,	the	state	
budget	allocation	for	correctional	facilities	increased	by	11%.		
	 Clearly	Governor	Corbett	did	not	prioritize	education,	and	his	budget	for	the	
2012‐2013	did	little	to	staunch	the	financial	bleeding	from	the	previous	year.	While	
basic	education	funding	remained	the	same	from	the	year	before,	Accountability	
Block	Grants—money	that	aided	special	programs	in	needy	Districts	such	as	
Philadelphia—were	eliminated.92		
	 The	future	of	education	funding	may	be	clearer.	With	about	a	year	and	half	
left	before	the	2014	election,	Governor	Corbett’s	polling	numbers	are	foreboding.	
Corbett—a	first‐term	Republican—has	an	overall	approval	rating	of	33%	in	the	
state,	with	58%	disapproving	of	his	job	as	Governor	(as	of	March	12,	2013).	
According	to	Public	Policy	Polling,	these	rates	make	him	the	third	most	unpopular	
governor	in	the	country.93	Furthermore,	he	trails	in	head‐to‐head	match	ups	against	
five	potential	democratic	opponents,	some	of	which	are	barely	known	in	the	state.	
Perhaps	most	worrying	for	him	is	that	more	Republicans	would	prefer	another	
candidate	to	run	in	2014	in	his	place.	Unless	he	can	save	his	already	struggling	
campaign,	a	Democratic	candidate	who	is	likely	to	sympathize	with	education	
advocates	will	take	the	governorship,	and	the	General	Assembly	will	likely	follow.	
																																																								
91	Markosek,	Joe.	“Revenue	Surplus	Exceeds	$785	million”.	PA	House	Appropriations	Committee:	Fast	
Facts.	July	1,	2011.		
Butterfield,	Sam.	“Spend	rainy‐day	fund,	advocates	tell	governor”.	Pittsburgh	Post‐Gazette.	June	17,	
2011.		
92	Hardy,	Dan.	“Corbett’s	Pennsylvania	budget	holds	the	line	on	school	spending	for	the	most	part”.		
The	Philadelphia	Inquirer.	Feb.	8,	2012.	
93	Jensen,	Tom.	“Corbett	in	dire	shape	for	reelection”.	Public	Policy	Polling.	Mar.	12,	2013.	
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Poorer	school	districts	such	as	Philadelphia	have	hope	that	they	may	experience	
funding	relief	in	the	near	future.		
	 As	Test	#3	strongly	implied,	the	massive	decrease	in	funding	likely	directly	
affected	the	declines	in	proficiency	rates	in	Philadelphia.	When	discussing	the	
declines,	the	State	Department	of	Education	is	quick	to	point	towards	the	cheating	
scandal	as	the	sole	cause	for	Philadelphia’s	demise.94	While	cheating	has	a	major	
role	in	what	happened,	the	State	should	not	hide	the	fact	that	their	decision	to	cash‐
strap	districts	led	to	a	severe	lack	of	resources	that	affected	students	on	test	day.	
	
Outside	pressures	from	Testing	Monitors	and	the	General	Public	
	 While	testing	monitors	and	the	media	certainly	created	a	negative	
atmosphere	at	flagged	schools,	their	work	can	hardly	be	called	blameworthy.	As	a	
news	organization,	The	Inquirer	had	every	right	to	publish	the	names	of	the	53	
flagged	schools	when	they	received	the	list—even	though	the	state	asked	them	not	
to.	Furthermore,	the	only	way	for	the	School	District	to	ensure	the	credibility	of	the	
2012	PSSA	tests	after	the	scathing	cheating	scandal	broke	out	was	to	increase	
security	throughout	the	District.	Most	probably,	if	these	methods	existed	before	
2012,	administrators	and	teachers	would	not	have	had	the	opportunity	to	
participate	in	cheating	in	the	first	place.	From	the	stories	told	by	whistle‐blowers	
from	Roosevelt	Middle	School	and	FitzSimons	High	School	(now	closed),	cheating	
was	obvious,	open,	and	easily	detectable.	Yet	the	lax	security	in	place	was	only	
improved	after	The	Public	School	Notebook	released	the	2009	report.	
																																																								
94	Graham,	Kristen;	Purcell,	Dylan.	“PSSA‐cheating	reforms	yield	lower	scores	across	
Pa.”.	The	Philadelphia	Inquirer.	July	30,	2012.	
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Cheaters	
	 Beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	several	schools	in	Philadelphia	participated	in	
cheating	from	2009‐2011	by	erasing	students’	wrong	answers	and	replacing	them	
with	correct	ones.	The	insurmountable	evidence	shows	that	at	many	schools,	test	
scores	did	not	accurately	represent	student	achievement.	Those	who	participated	in	
cheating	may	have	been	under	immense	pressure	to	raise	proficiency	levels.	Yet	
their	actions	of	misrepresenting	students’	knowledge	ended	up	hurting	those	
students	who	needed	targeting	instruction.	Furthermore,	their	actions	are	an	insult	
to	the	majority	of	teachers	and	administrators	who	tried	to	honestly	raise	student	
achievement	and	faced	the	consequences	of	the	results	of	their	efforts.	The	entire	
District,	their	employees,	and	their	students	have	suffered	because	of	the	actions	of	
the	minority,	and	it	will	be	a	long	time	before	the	District	can	start	to	build	up	a	
more	positive	reputation.		
	 What’s	perhaps	most	worrying	about	this	scandal	is	that	it	only	uncovered	
the	most	detectable	forms	of	cheating.	Schools	may	have	got	away	with	a	multitude	
of	other	kinds	of	cheating	before	the	District	increased	security	in	2012.	Easier	and	
far	less‐detectable	ways	of	cheating	include:	opening	test	booklets	early	in	order	to	
teach	specific	concepts	and	problems	before	the	test,	coaching	students	to	answer	a	
question	correctly	(whether	by	implication	or	simply	telling	them	the	correct	
response),	and	allowing	students	to	take	the	test	in	groups	or	with	outside	help.	
These	forms	of	“soft”	cheating	can	only	be	detectable	through	observation.	Higher	
scores	than	normal	derived	from	these	scores	can	be—and	have	been—explained	
away	as	implementations	of	reform	initiatives	(e.g.	professional	development,	a	new	
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curriculum,	etc.).	How	much	cheating	actually	occurred	in	Philadelphia	schools	
before	2012?	Since	the	analysis	conducted	by	the	state	only	includes	erasure	
methods,	the	answer	will	likely	remain	unknown.	
	 Although	much	remains	a	mystery,	the	State	and	District	have	damning	
evidence	that	specific	teachers	and	administrators	were	involved	in	testing	
improprieties.	In	fact,	the	Inquirer	has	reported	that	some	principals,	assistant	
principals,	and	teachers	from	the	53	flagged	schools	“have	confessed	to	
investigators.”95	Yet	as	of	the	time	of	this	study,	not	a	single	District	employee	has	
faced	repercussions	for	their	involvement	in	the	scandal.		
	 In	fact,	the	only	possible	firing	of	an	employee	that	may	have	been	connected	
to	the	cheating	scandal	occurred	last	summer	under	suspicious	circumstances.	
According	to	Notebook	reporter	Benjamin	Herold,	Daniel	Piotrowski—the	former	
Executive	Director	for	Accountability	and	Assessment—was	assigned	to	personally	
monitor	flagged	schools	in	2012	(along	with	several	other	central	office	staff).	
Piotrowski	was	placed	at	Wagner	Middle	School	and	found	seventeen	testing	
violations,	including	observing	a	teacher	“coaching	students	on	how	to	answer	test	
questions.”96	After	reporting	the	violations,	Piotrowski	was	removed	from	the	
school	as	a	monitor	and	his	allegations	were	quickly	dismissed.	Other	schools	that	
wee	reported	for	fewer	violations	had	to	undergo	an	investigation	process	that	
included	interviews	and	a	detailed	report.	The	incidents	at	Wagner—a	school	where	
the	principal	in	2009	held	the	Chief	Academic	Officer	position	in	the	District	at	this	
																																																								
95	Graham,	Kristen	&	Purcell,	Dylan.	“PSSA‐cheating	reforms…”	
96	Herold,	Benjamin.	“New	cheating	concerns	at	Philly	school	met	with	‘baffling’	response”.	The	
Philadelphia	Public	School	Notebook.	Oct	23,	2012.	
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time—produced	no	such	process.	The	District	later	fired	Piotrowski	in	July	2012	for	
unknown	reasons	(neither	Piotrowski	nor	the	District	commented	in	Herold’s	
story).	
	 No	matter	the	exact	circumstances	surrounding	the	events	at	Wagner,	the	
District	and	State	have	failed	to	act	swiftly	in	punishing	those	responsible	for	
cheating.	Both	parties	claim	that	the	investigations	are	still	ongoing.	Over	a	year	and	
a	half	has	passed	since	the	scandal	first	broke	out,	yet	the	only	reshuffling	of	
teachers	and	principals	that	has	occurred	has	been	for	reasons	disconnected	to	
cheating.	District	principals	who	are	highly	implicated	in	the	scandal	still	hold	their	
jobs.	Neither	the	District	nor	its	students	can	move	on	and	overcome	the	negative	
emotions	brought	until	the	State	of	District	cleans	house.	Philadelphia	students	
deserve	to	learn	in	peace	without	the	politics	of	education	policy	hindering	their	
progress	in	the	classroom.			
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XI.	Conclusion	
	 On	March	29,	2013,	after	a	two	and	a	half	year	investigation,	the	State	of	
Georgia	indicted	35	educators	who	participated	in	organized	cheating	in	the	Atlanta	
Public	Schools	system.97	These	educators	include	teachers,	principals,	and	
administrators—including	the	former	Superintendant	who	may	spend	up	to	45	
years	in	prison	for	her	role	in	the	scandal.	Will	Philadelphia’s	cheating	scandal	come	
to	a	similar	resolution	as	Atlanta’s?	Probably	not.	One	reason	is	the	scope	of	the	
investigations.	While	the	then‐Governor	of	Georgia	set	aside	a	budget	“substantial	
enough	to	hire	more	than	50	state	investigators,”	the	School	District	of	Philadelphia,	
still	under	extreme	financial	stress,	has	hired	a	handful	of	lawyers	pro	bono	to	help	
with	their	load.98	Furthermore,	criminal	charges	cannot	be	sought		against	
educators	in	Pennsylvania	for	cheating	that	occurred	before	2012.		
	 Once	the	State	of	Pennsylvania	does	release	the	findings	of	their	
investigation,	however,	one	conclusion	is	inevitable	and	unsurprising:	cheating	
occurred	at	an	alarming	rate	in	Philadelphia	schools	between	2009	and	2011.	The	
erasure	analysis	data	provides	nearly	irrefutable	evidence	that	tests	were	tampered	
with.	Schools	that	were	flagged	for	cheating	performed	statistically	significantly	
better	in	math	and	reading	scores	before	2012.	But	when	the	public	caught	wind	of	
cheating	and	put	an	end	to	it	in	2012,	flagged	schools	and	grade	levels	performed	
statistically	significantly	worse	than	their	non‐flagged	counterparts—even	when	
controlling	for	drastic	budget	cuts.		
																																																								
97	Winerip,	Michael.	“Ex‐Schools	Chief	in	Atlanta	Is	Indicted	in	Testing	Scandal”.	The	New	York	Times.	
Mar.	29,	2013.	
98	Ibid.	
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	 Without	a	doubt,	other	factors	contributed	to	the	massive	test	score	declines	
experienced	by	Philadelphia	schools	in	2012.	Governor	Tom	Corbett	and	his	
Republican‐led	Assembly	crippled	Philadelphia	school	resources	by	eliminating	
nearly	10%	of	their	state	funding.	Even	when	controlling	for	a	school’s	flagged	
status,	school	budget	cuts	had	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	school	proficiency	
rates.	Additionally,	the	evidence	that	non‐flagged	grades	in	flagged	schools	
performed	worse	than	non‐flagged	grades	in	non‐flagged	schools	suggest	that	
unexplained	influences	in	flagged	schools	affected	the	proficiency	rates	across	the	
entire	school.	Nevertheless,	none	of	these	findings	should	cloud	the	fact	that	
Philadelphia	has	had	a	cheating	problem,	and	that	problem	will	not	go	away	until	
those	responsible	leave.			
	 Educators	who	participated	in	cheating	may	rightly	claim	that	their	actions	
were	encouraged	by	high‐stakes	testing	standards	set	by	President	Bush’s	No	Child	
Left	Behind	act.	The	act,	which	has	yet	to	be	re‐written	by	Congress	during	the	
Obama	administration,	labels	schools	as	successful	or	failing	based	almost	solely	on	
test	scores.	In	reaction	to	the	strong	influence	of	testing,	states	across	the	country	
have	made	their	tests	easier	while	districts	and	schools	will	stop	at	almost	nothing	
to	raise	scores,	leaving	no	school	in	the	nation	unaffected.		Whatever	the	good	
intentions	of	the	act	were,	the	unintended	consequences	have	caused	a	net	negative	
effect	on	the	nation’s	education	system	as	a	whole,	especially	in	urban	districts	
where	schools	with	high	poverty	concentrations	are	asked	to	perform	to	high	
expectations	without	the	necessary	financial	resources	to	do	so.		
	 84
	 This	study	shares	a	story	about	the	neglect	of	low‐performing	students	that	
starts	on	the	national	level	and	finishes	in	the	classroom.	Education	is	a	business	
that	is	rife	with	politics	that	often	provides	incentives	for	educators	to	ignore	the	
main	purpose	of	education.	Over	the	past	decade,	national	policy	has	failed	
educators,	and	in	turn	educators	have	failed	their	students.	As	has	been	the	case	in	
urban	education	for	decades,	politics	and	the	ambitions	of	self‐minded	educators	
has	hindered	instruction	of	the	students	with	the	highest	need	for	a	quality	
education.		
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Appendix		
Table	10:	Philadelphia	Schools	Flagged	for	Erasure	Irregularities	(Marked	
with	Grade	Levels	and	Subjects	Flagged	by	School	and	Year)	
Grade	Levels	 		 3rd	 4th	 5th	 6th	 7th	 8th	 11th	 Percentage	
Flagged	
Schools	 Year	 M	 R	 M R M R M R M R M R M	 R	
Bridesburg	
09	 		 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
Catharine	
09	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 Y	 		 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
Cayuga	
09	 		 		 		 Y Y Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 		 Y 		 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Childs	
09	 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
10	 Y	 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 Y 		 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
Cramp	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 37.5%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 87.5%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 37.5%	
Day	
09	 		 		 Y Y 		 		 Y 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 33.3%	
10	 		 		 		 Y 		 		 Y Y Y 		 Y 		 		 		 41.7%	
11	 Y	 		 Y Y 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 41.7%	
Decatur	
09	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 41.7%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Disston	
09	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 41.7%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 41.7%	
FS	Edmonds	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 87.5%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
Emlen	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 87.5%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
Forrest	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
Fulton	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 Y	 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 62.5%	
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Heston	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 Y 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 58.3%	
Houston	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 8.3%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 Y Y 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 58.3%	
Huey	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 58.3%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 Y 		 		 		 75.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 91.7%	
Kearny	
09	 Y	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 Y	 		 		 		 Y Y 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
11	 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Kelly	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Lamberton	
Elem.	
09	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
10	 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y 		 		 33.3%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 Y Y 		 		 83.3%	
Locke	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
11	 		 		 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
Loesche	
09	 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 Y Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
Marshall,	J.	
09	 Y	 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
11	 Y	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Marshall,	T.	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 58.3%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
McClure	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
McDaniel	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 Y 		 Y 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 58.3%	
Mitchell	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
10	 		 Y	 		 		 		 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
Munoz‐Marin	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 50.0%	
10	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 8.3%	
11	 Y	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 33.3%	
Olney	El.	 09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	
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10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
Patterson	
09	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
10	 Y	 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
Pollock	
09	 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 37.5%	
10	 		 		 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
11	 		 		 Y 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Rhawnhurst	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Richmond	
09	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
11	 		 Y	 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
Rowen	
09	 Y	 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
10	 Y	 Y	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 33.3%	
Sullivan	
09	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 66.7%	
10	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
11	 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 16.7%	
Welsh	
09	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y 		 Y 		 		 		 41.7%	
10	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 41.7%	
11	 		 Y	 		 Y 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 41.7%	
Willard	
09	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
10	 Y	 Y	 Y Y 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 100.0%	
11	 Y	 Y	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 50.0%	
Clemente	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 		 		 75.0%	
Conwell	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 12.5%	
Leeds	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 		 		 25.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 25.0%	
Penn	Treaty	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y 		 		 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 83.3%	
Pepper	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 		 12.5%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 Y 		 Y 		 		 		 37.5%	
Roosevelt	 09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	
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11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	
Tilden	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y Y Y 		 		 100.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
Wagner	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 66.7%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y Y Y Y 		 		 66.7%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y 		 		 Y 		 		 33.3%	
Bok	Tech	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
Comm.	Tech	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
Frankford	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
Furness	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
Kensington	
CAPA	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
King	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
Northeast	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
Phila.	Milatary	
Academy	@	
Elverson	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
Randolph	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 0.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 50.0%	
Strawberry	
Mansion	
09	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
10	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 Y	 100.0%	
11	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 Y	 		 50.0%	
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